Sabrina Rahofy v. Lynn Steadman : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Sabrina Rahofy v. Lynn Steadman : Brief of
Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lowell V. Smith; Trent D. Holgate; Smith & Glauser; Attorneys for Appellees.
Jamis M. Gardner; Thomas W. Seiler; Robinson, Seiler & Anderson; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Rahofy v. Steadman, No. 20090512 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1744
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LYNN STEADMAN, an individual, and 
STEADMAN LAND & LIVESTOCK, LLC 
Defendants and Petitioners. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 
20090512-CA 
Supreme Court No. 20110011-SC 
Appeal from Opinion of the Utah 
Court of Appeals 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS LYNN STEADMAN AND 
STEADMAN LAND & LIVESTOCK, LLC 
Jamis M. Gardner 
Thomas W. Seiler 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, L.C. 
2500 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 84603-1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: 801-375-1920 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sabrina Rahofy 
Lowell V. Smith 
Trent D. Hoi gate 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: 801-562-5555 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Lynn Steadman and 
Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC 
F I L E D UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 1 7 2011 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LYNN STEADMAN, an individual, and 
STEADMAN LAND & LIVESTOCK, LLC 
Defendants and Petitioners. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 
20090512-C A 
Supreme Court No. 20110011-
Appeal from Opinion of the 1 
Court of Appeals 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS LYNN STEADMAN AND 
STEADMAN LAND & LIVESTOCK, LLC 
SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual, 
Jamis M. Gardner 
Thomas W. Seiler 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, L.C. 
2500 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 84603-1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: 801-375-1920 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sabrina Rahofy 
Lowell V. Smith 
Trent D. Holgate 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: 801-562-5555 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Lynn Steadman and 
Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC 
LIST AND DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioners Lynn 
Steadman, an individual and Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC, will be referred to herein 
as "Steadman" or "Defendants"; and Respondent Sabrina Rahofy, an individual, will be 
referred to herein as "Rahofy" or "Plaintiff. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court has granted 
certiorari as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals misstated or misconstrued the factual background 
in the course of its evaluation of the issues on appeal; 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's order 
compelling authorizations and in prescribing procedures for obtaining records from out-of-
state third parties. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals for correctness. Magana v. Dave Rock Construction, 2009, Utah 45, f^ 19, 215 P. 
3d 143. 
The standard of review of a trial court's order in matters of discovery is an abuse of 
discretion. Gardner v. Board ofCnty Comm'srs, 2008 UT 6, 178 P. 3d 893 and State v. 
Tanner, 2011 Ut.App. 39, 248 P. 3d 61. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This lawsuit arises from an automobile accident which occurred on August 7, 2005 
in Cedar City, Utah. R. 4. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was a resident of the State 
of Illinois and was traveling through Utah. R. 4. 
Plaintiff filed suit in the Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Utah, alleging that, as 
a result of the accident and as a proximate result of Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff 
sustained significant personal injury, R. 6, disability, R. 7, and damages (including general 
damages, medical expenses, future medical expenses, future lost income, loss of future 
earning capacity, lost wages, interest and other damages). R. 7. 
Defendant answered Plaintiffs Complaint. R. 16. 
Plaintiff filed Initial Disclosures identifying, among other things, the identity of health 
care providers who rendered treatment to Plaintiff following the accident. R. 26 - 27. 
Defendants served Interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure1, R. 34, asking Plaintiff to fully disclose all special damages she sustained, all 
medical expenses and future medical expenses she sustained, all lost wages she claimed, all 
future losses of earning capacity, and describe all documentation which support her claims. 
Interrogatory No. 10. She was also asked to described in detail all injuries and symptoms 
she sustained and to identify whether any such injuries or damages pre-dated (or post-dated) 
the accident. See Interrogatories No. 11 and 13. She was asked to identify the physicians 
XA copy of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff is attached as 
Addendum 10. 
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who had treated her prior to the accident. See, Interrogatory No. 12. She was asked to 
identify each medical care provider who had examined or treated her within the prior 20 
years and to provide the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to the 
treatment, and the results of such treatment. See, Interrogatory No. 14. She was also asked 
to identify all employment she had had within the past 20 years. See, Interrogatory No. 15. 
Defendant served Requests for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rule 34, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure2, asking Plaintiff to produce, among other things, each medical 
report, record, diagnostic study or test, or other document which related to the injuries or 
symptoms claimed to be caused, aggravated or related to the accident and the cost of each 
billing. See Request for Production, Nos. 8, 9 and 10. She was asked to produce each 
medical report, record or document pertaining to any pre-existing condition. See, Request 
for Production No. 11. She was asked to produce the documents which support her claim 
for lost wages, impairment to earning capacity, and her state and federal income tax returns. 
See Request for Production No. 12 -14. She was asked to produce copies of all documents 
identified in the Answers to Interrogatories. See Request for Production No. 20. 
In response to Defendants' interrogatories, Plaintiff identified employers and 
healthcare providers who had rendered treatment to her before the accident. She indicated 
that she was in the process of gathering documents in connection with the Request for 
Production of Documents. She indicated that "She should have the documents within two 
weeks." R. 70. When documents were not produced by Plaintiff, Defendants forwarded 
2
 A copy of Defendants' First Request for Production of Documents is attached 
as Addendum 11. 
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authorizations to Plaintiff which would allow Defendant to obtain the out-of-state 
employment and medical records. R. 71. Counsel for Plaintiff refused to sign the 
Authorizations for the release of medical and employment records. R. 72. 
When attempts to informally resolve the issue of whether Plaintiff was required to 
sign the requested authorizations failed, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel asking the trial 
court to order Plaintiff to sign the authorizations, allowing Defendant to obtain the records 
directly from the health care providers and employers. R. 66-68. Defendants argued that 
Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a defendant to obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action. R. 72. Defendants argued that Plaintiff had placed her medical condition in 
issue and had waived the privilege against production of the documents. R. 76. Defendants 
argued that, since many of the health care providers and employers were not within the state 
of Utah, Defendants could not obtain the required information by subpoena issued by a Utah 
court. R. 73. Defendants cited the trial court to Hales v. Oldrovd, 999 P.2d 588 (Utah App. 
2000) (and other cases) wherein the Utah Court of Appeals held that courts are empowered 
to compel a Plaintiff to execute authorizations to allow defendants to obtain medical records 
from out-of-state providers. R. 74. 
Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Compel, arguing that Plaintiff had already provided 
"meaningful discovery responses" (by simply identifying the names and addresses of 
employers and health care providers), R. 87 - 88, that Defendants are not entitled to the 
requested authorizations to allow them to obtain records from prior health care providers or 
x 
employers, R. 88 - 89, that the records sought are privileged , R. 91, and that Plaintiff was 
not required to sign the requested authorizations for the release of employment records, R. 
92-93. Plaintiff claimed the records are "irrelevant." R. 93. Plaintiff further argued that 
she did not possess a copy of her employment records, and stated that it is "unknown whether 
an employer would release the entire personnel file even if the employee requested it. 
Defendants have been provided the contact information for the employers. Defendants may 
contact the employers themselves." R. 94. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts 
A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Compel was held by the trial court on May 22, 
2009. R. 171. After reviewing the memoranda on the Motion to Compel and hearing oral 
argument from counsel for both parties, the Honorable G. Michael Westfall issued the trial 
court's Order requiring Plaintiff to execute authorizations for all out-of-state employment 
records and to provide those authorizations to Defendants. R. 174. The trial Court also 
ordered Plaintiff to execute authorizations to allow Defendants to obtain the out-of-state 
medical records identified by Plaintiff. R. 175. 
Because of Plaintiff s claim of the sensitive nature of some of the records which might 
be produced, the trial court outlined a procedure where, if Plaintiff claimed a specific 
privilege of privacy to specific medical records, the records could be obtained by Plaintiff 
(not Defendants) and submitted to the trial court for an in camera review and determination 
as to whether Defendants would be entitled to review the records3. 
3A complete copy of the transcript of the parties' oral argument on Defendants' 
Motion to Compel before the trial court is included as Addendum 8. 
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On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed an ExParte Motion to Stay Order. R. 178. Plaintiff 
filed an Interlocutory Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court's order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel. 
On or about January 6, 2011, Defendants filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On 
March 29, 2011, the Writ of Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On August 7,2006, Plaintiff and Defendant Lynn Steadman were involved in 
an automobile accident (hereinafter the "Accident") in Cedar City, Utah. Opinion at % 2, R. 
3 -8 . 
2. At the time of the accident Plaintiff was a resident of Illinois and not a resident 
of the State of Utah. R. 4. 
3. At the time the accident occurred, Plaintiff was on her way to California to 
start a new job. R. 115. 
4. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on October 4, 2007, claiming personal 
injuries as a result of the accident. R. 3-8. 
5. Plaintiff alleges she suffered injuries, "including, but not limited to, injury 
to her right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, right foot, and injury to her 
upper and lower back. R. 6. 
6. Plaintiff alleges that she has "suffered great pain, emotional stress, loss of 
enjoyment of life," and claims she has suffered "permanent physical injury and disability 
with a whole body disability rating of 20%." R. 6-7. 
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7. Plaintiff claims she suffers chronic neck pain since the accident, and is unable 
to work at the computer for extended periods of time without pain flaring up. She claims that 
her neck pain interferes with her Yoga practice and flares up when she is sitting for extended 
periods of time. She claims she is unable to run for long distances and unable to pick up 
heavy objects. She claims she has pain and pinched nerves between her shoulder blades, 
which pain interferes with her Yoga. She claims she is unable to do push-ups. She alleges 
severe panic attacks and alleged mood swings due to inability to teach Yoga at the level she 
was accustomed to prior to the accident. R. 102. 
8. Plaintiff seeks damages for medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost 
wages, future lost income, and loss of future earning capacity. R. 7. 
9. On or about January 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed Initial Disclosures, wherein 
Plaintiff disclosed a number of health care providers who treated Plaintiff following the 
accident of August 7,2006 and referred to an "Independent Medical Evaluation" dated April 
4, 2007 by Stuart W. King, M.D., in which Dr. King: 
• referred to her past medical history, including "several sports related injuries;" 
• referred to her complaints of "occasional back pain and some chiropractic 
treatment in the past, before the accident;" 
reviewed her work in the past as a "professional dog walker;" 
opines that she will "require chronic pain management for the rest of her life;" 
and 
assigned a whole person "impairment rating" to Plaintiff of 20%. R. 25-28. 
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10. In the Initial Disclosures, Plaintiff also referred to an Evaluation of Economic 
Losses submitted from Dr. Paul H. Randle, wherein Dr. Randle: 
• estimated the "present value of the economic losses created as a result of 
Sabrina's injuries, not including statutory pre-judgment interest, is $724,016. 
• Refers to her "normal capacity to earn" as being equal to $ 17,060 per year; and 
• makes other assumptions regarding her claimed lost wages and lost earning 
capacity. R. 25-28. 
11. On January 26, 2008, Defendants served Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents on Plaintiff, seeking (among other information) the identity of all 
health care providers who had rendered medical treatment to Plaintiff within 20 years of the 
accident. R. 34 - 37. 
12. Defendants served Interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. R. 34. In the Interrogatories, Plaintiff was asked to: 
10. State and fully describe all special damages that you are claiming in this 
lawsuit including but not limited to medical expenses, future medical 
expenses, lost wages, future losses of earning capacity, etc., and indicate the 
amounts you are claiming, your method for arriving at each such amount, and 
describe all documentation in your possession which supports or may refute 
such claims. 
11. Describe in detail all injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental 
or emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been 
caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by the occurrence. 
12. If any of the injuries or conditions for which you claim damages for 
personal injuries caused by the accident are an aggravation of a preexisting 
condition, please identify which conditions are an aggravation of a preexisting 
condition, describe in detail the preexisting conditions, and state the name and 
address of each medical practitioner who treated you for the preexisting 
condition, the date of treatment and the nature of such treatment. 
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13. If you have suffered any aggravation of the symptoms or injuries which 
you claim from this accident since the time of the accident, please state the 
date of each such aggravation, the cause of each such aggravation, a detailed 
description of each aggravation, the names and addresses of all persons who 
may have witnessed the aggravation, and the names and addresses of all 
medical practitioners rendering treatment for such aggravations. 
14. State the name and address of each medical care provider, including but 
not limited to, each hospital, psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health agency, 
mental health therapist, chiropractor, nurse practitioner, physician's assistant, 
acupuncturist, neuropathologist, massage therapist, or other health care 
provider who has examined you or treated you during the past 20 years and 
state the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to treatment, 
and the results of such treatment or examinations. 
15. With regard to all employment or businesses that you have worked for 
in the past 20 years, please state the name and address of each employer, the 
date of commencement and termination, the place of employment, the nature 
of the duties performed, the name and address of each supervisor, the rate of 
pay received and the reasons for termination. See Interrogatories, 10-15. 
13. Defendants also served Requests for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rule 
34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 36. Plaintiff was asked to produce, among other 
things: 
8. Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital report, or other 
document which relates to the injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental 
or emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been 
caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by it. 
9. Each and every report of any diagnostic study, test or procedure performed 
since the accident. 
10. Each and every receipt, bill, check, invoice or other document which 
supports your claim for medical expenses allegedly incurred as a result of this 
accident. 
11. Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital record, hospital 
report, or other document which relates to any pre-existing condition which 
you allege was aggravated by the accident. 
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12. Each and every report or other document which you contend supports your 
claim for lost time from gainful employment. 
13. Each and every document which you contend supports your claim for 
impairment to earning capacity. 
14. Each and every record, written memoranda, copies of Federal or State 
Income Tax Returns, or other document which purports to show all or any 
portion of the income received by you for the five years immediately preceding 
the accident to the present time. 
20. Please produce each and every document identified in your answers to 
interrogatories served simultaneously with these requests. 
See Interrogatories, No. 8-14, 20. 
14. In response to Defendants' Interrogatory number 14 (requesting "the name 
and address of each medical provider... who has examined or treated [Plaintiff] during the 
past 20 years [and] . . . the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to 
treatment, and the results of such treatment or examinations"), Plaintiff identified: 
Dr. D. Dettore, 6827 Stanley Ave., Berwyn, IL 60402. Primary physician for 
the past 25 years. Plaintiff generally experienced the cold and chronic ear 
aches; 
• Dr. Cecil Brown in Brookfield, IL, Chiropractic care in 1994 for sports related 
injury to Plaintiffs back; 
Planned Parenthood, 1000 E Washington, Springfield, IL 62703. 
Gynecological care from 1999 to 2001; 
Women's Health Care Center, 3435 N. Sheffield, Chicago, IL 60657. 
Gynecological care from 2002 to 2007; 
Woodbridge Health Center, 8580 Cinder Bed Road, Woodbridge, VA22191. 
Obstetric care during current pregnancy. R.104. 
- 5 -
15. In response to Defendants' Interrogatory number 15 (requesting the name and 
address of each of Plaintiff s employers for the past 20 years, the hire and termination date 
for each employer, the nature of her duties performed, the name and address of each 
supervisor, her pay rate and the reasons for termination), Plaintiff identified 25 employers; 
17 of which had employed Plaintiff since 2001. R. 104-105. 
16. On May 8, 2008, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel containing 
authorizations for Plaintiff to execute to allow Defendants to obtain Plaintiffs medical and 
employment records, since the healthcare providers and employers are not within the State 
of Utah and not subject to a Utah-issued subpoena. R. 110-111. 
17. Plaintiff did not provide any signed Releases for her medical or employment 
records as requested by Defendants. R. 113. 
18. On May 14,2008, Plaintiff specifically declined to sign authorizations for the 
release of employment and medical records. R. 72. 
19. In a May 21st, 2008 letter, defense counsel again attempted to obtain signed 
authorizations for release of the records of the entities identified. R. 80-82. 
20. On August 15,2008, due to Plaintiffs refusal to sign any of the authorizations, 
Defendants filed a Motion to Compel, requesting the trial court to order Plaintiff to sign the 
authorizations. R. 66-68. 
21. On December 8, 2008, oral argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel was 
scheduled by the trial court. R. 152. Immediately prior to the time of the hearing, counsel 
for both parties met to discuss the pending motion. During the meeting, counsel believed 
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they had reached an agreement regarding the production of the documents Defendants 
sought. Counsel indicated to the trial court that they had reached an agreement on the issue 
of the production of the records, whereby the medical records of the health care providers 
and the employment records would be obtained and submitted either to the trial court or a 
third party (to be agreed upon by counsel). The trial court (or agreed-upon third party) 
would review disputed medical/employment records to determine which records are 
reasonably relevant to the case and subject to discovery. The parameters to determine 
relevance would be stipulated to by counsel. The parties also indicated that, if an agreement 
could not be reached on particular issues, counsel would re-submit the Motion to Compel for 
decision by the trial court or request a hearing. R. 158. 
22. After the December 8th hearing, despite the preliminary agreement, the parties 
were unable to reach a formal agreement regarding execution of the authorizations and 
production of the identified employment/medical records. When informal discussion broke 
down concerning the accumulation and review of the records, upon notice from counsel, the 
matter was again presented to the trial court for resolution. The trial court scheduled oral 
argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel for May 22, 2009. R. 169-170. 
23. After considering the Memoranda from the parties on Defendants' Motion to 
Compel, and after oral argument, the trial court, Honorable G. Michael Westfall ordered: 
• Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return the 
signed authorizations to the defendants . . . on or before June 22, 2009. 
Defendants were authorized to access any employment records with regard to 
Plaintiff. R. 174. 
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Plaintiff shall provide the Court and Defendants a complete list of every 
medical service Plaintiff had received - including the date, medical provider, 
medical problem presented and medical service provided. Plaintiff shall also 
designate which medical records Plaintiff believes are not relevant to the case 
and, therefore, subject to privacy. R. 175. 
• Defendants were authorized to receive the medical records for those records 
for which Plaintiff did not claim a continuing privacy privilege. Plaintiff was 
ordered to either disclose those specific records directly to Defendants or 
provide a signed authorization for the release of the records to Defendants. R. 
175. 
• If Plaintiff claimed a continuing privacy privilege or claimed the requested 
medical records were irrelevant to the issues raised in the litigation, 
Defendants would have 30 days after receipt of the list of the healthcare 
providers to object to Plaintiffs claimed continuing privacy privilege, by filing 
an appropriate motion with the trial court. R. 175. 
In the event Defendants filed the motion with the Court seeking the records, 
Plaintiff would have 30 days to obtain the records to which continuing privacy 
privilege was claimed and to submit those records to the trial court for in 
camera review. The trial court would then make a determination as to whether 
or not the records would be disclosed to defendants. R. 174-175. 
23. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. R. 185. 
24. The Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion on December 9, 2010, and 
concluded "Because Defendants could have accessed the requested records without 
circumventing the discovery rules, the district court abused its discretion in entertaining and 
granting the Motion to Compel. Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010, Utah App. 350, ^  12. 
25.The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court's Order compelling 
discovery and remanded the case to the district court, claiming the district court "abused its 
discretion in granting Defendants' Motion to Compel when defendants failed to request 
documents pursuant to the discovery rules." Rahofy, % 14. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals misconstrued the factual background in the course of its 
evaluation of the issues on appeal in this case. First, Plaintiff claimed, for the first time on 
appeal, that Defendants did not make a formal discovery request for Plaintiffs medical and 
employment records. Plaintiff previously acknowledged in her brief to the Utah Court of 
Appeals that this issue was not raised before the trial court. Defendants did formally request 
Plaintiffs medical and employment records in Defendants' Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiff. 
Second, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order compelling 
Plaintiff to execute authorizations enabling Defendants to obtain Plaintiffs out-of-state 
medical and employment records. The trial court, prior to granting Defendants' Motion to 
Compel, heard all of the relevant background facts, reviewed the procedural history of the 
case, and correctly determined that Plaintiff should be ordered to execute the authorizations 
prepared by Defendants. The trial court is in the best position to handle discovery disputes 
because it is familiar with the issues in the cases before it. 
Third, the Court of Appeals, unnecessarily imposed a procedure to obtain out-of-state 
medical records which is unjust, expensive, burdensome, and overly complicated. Further, 
even if the procedure outlined by the Court of Appeals were to be followed, many health care 
providers who will not produce records (even in response to a records subpoena) without a 
signed authorization from the patient. 
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Finally, the procedure set forth by the Court of Appeals is not in harmony with prior 
decisions of Utah courts (as well as courts from other jurisdictions) which have considered 
the issue of whether a trial court has discretion to order a Plaintiff to execute authorizations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXPRESSING THE 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THIS MATTER 
Utah Appellate Courts have a long-standing policy of refusing to hear issues raised 
for the first time on appeal. This case is a classic example of why this policy is so essential 
See. Moa v. Edwards. 2011 UT App 140, 681 Ut. Adv. Rep. 26, Cannon v. Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center, Inc.. 2005 UT App 3525121 P.3d 74 andlnreE.R.. 2001 UT App 
66,21P.3d680. 
On appeal, for the first time, Plaintiff argued that Defendants "never made a formal 
discovery request. . . for the medical or employment records which they seek to obtain 
through the releases. Furthermore, the Defendants have never made a formal discovery 
request... for the signed releases." Appellant's (Rahofy's ) Brief, to the Court of Appeals, 
p. 28. Plaintiff expressly acknowledged in her brief that these arguments were never raised 
nor discussed in the trial Court: 
Plaintiff concedes that Rule 37 and its requirements were never discussed in 
memorandum or argument related to Defendants' Motion to Compel." 
Appellant's (Rahofy's) Brief, p. 28. 
- 1 0 -
Nevertheless, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants' alleged failure to formally request 
pursuant to Rule 34 was "plain error," that the "error is harmful," and that there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.. [or the] "confidence 
in the verdict is undermined." Appellant's (Rahofy's) Brief, p. 29. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting 
Defendants' motion to compel when Defendants failed to request documents pursuant to the 
discovery rules of Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rahofv. ^J14. 
In actuality, Defendants had formally requested the disputed records. In the 
Interrogatories served on Plaintiff, she was asked to identify: 
10. State and fully describe all special damages that you are claiming in this 
lawsuit including but not limited to medical expenses, future medical 
expenses, lost wages, future losses of earning capacity, etc., and indicate the 
amounts you are claiming, your method for arriving at each such amount, and 
describe all documentation in your possession which supports or may refute 
such claims. 
11. Describe in detail all injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental 
or emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been 
caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by the occurrence. 
12. If any of the injuries or conditions for which you claim damages for 
personal injuries caused by the accident are an aggravation of a preexisting 
condition, please identify which conditions are an aggravation of a preexisting 
condition, describe in detail the preexisting conditions, and state the name and 
address of each medical practitioner who treated you for the preexisting 
condition, the date of treatment and the nature of such treatment. 
13. If you have suffered any aggravation of the symptoms or injuries which 
you claim from this accident since the time of the accident, please state the 
date of each such aggravation, the cause of each such aggravation, a detailed 
description of each aggravation, the names and addresses of all persons who 
may have witnessed the aggravation, and the names and addresses of all 
medical practitioners rendering treatment for such aggravations. 
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14. State the name and address of each medical care provider, including but 
not limited to, each hospital, psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health agency, 
mental health therapist, chiropractor, nurse practitioner, physician's assistant, 
acupuncturist, neuropathologist, massage therapist, or other health care 
provider who has examined you or treated you during the past 20 years and 
state the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to treatment, 
and the results of such treatment or examinations. 
15. With regard to all employment or businesses that you have worked for 
in the past 20 years, please state the name and address of each employer, the 
date of commencement and termination, the place of employment, the nature 
of the duties performed, the name and address of each supervisor, the rate of 
pay received and the reasons for termination. 
16. If you have ever applied for or received disability payments, workers 
compensation payments, Medicaid benefits, UMAP benefits, or health 
insurance benefits, please state the name, address and telephone number of 
each provider that you applied to, the insurance plan or group number used to 
identify yourself, the dates of the coverage, and sought, whether your claim 
was granted or denied, and if granted, the nature of benefits received. 
17. If you have ever applied for unemployment insurance benefits, please 
identify the claim number, assigned to each claim you have made, indicate 
whether you were granted or denied benefits for each claim made, the date of 
each decision, and the name of the government agency that issued the decision. 
18. If you have ever applied for services or benefits from any state or 
federal agency including but not limited to the Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation, Utah State Office of Workforce Services, and the Utah 
Department of Human Services, please indicate the date and governmental 
agency you applied for said services or benefits, identify the claim number 
assigned to each application you made if a claim number was assigned, 
indicate whether your application for services or benefits was granted or 
denied, and if granted, describe in detail the kind of services or benefits you 
have received. 
See, Addendum 10, Interrogatories, No. 10-18. 
In the Requests for Production of Documents, Plaintiff was asked to produce, among 
other documents: 
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8. Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital report, or other 
document which relates to the injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental 
or emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been 
caused, aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by it. 
9. Each and every report of any diagnostic study, test or procedure performed 
since the accident. 
10. Each and every receipt, bill, check, invoice or other document which 
supports your claim for medical expenses allegedly incurred as a result of this 
accident. 
11. Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital record, hospital 
report, or other document which relates to any pre-existing condition which 
you allege was aggravated by the accident. 
12. Each and every report or other document which you contend supports your 
claim for lost time from gainful employment. 
13. Each and every document which you contend supports your claim for 
impairment to earning capacity. 
14. Each and every record, written memoranda, copies of Federal or State 
Income Tax Returns, or other document which purports to show all or any 
portion of the income received by you for the five years immediately preceding 
the accident to the present time. 
15. Each and every application, record, written memoranda, report or other 
document submitted to the governmental agency and/or private provider to 
support your claim for disability benefits and/or worker's compensation 
benefits, the decision granting or denying benefits, and if granted, each and 
every record, written memoranda, report or other document which shows all 
or any portion of payments received from disability or workmen's 
compensation. 
16. Please provide copies of all health insurance records, claim forms, 
eligibility cards, or other documents you may have in your possession with 
respect to all health insurance policies, plans of health insurance, or health 
insurers in your possession. 
17. Please provide copies of all of your unemployment insurance benefit 
applications, state agency records granting or denying unemployment 
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insurance benefits, or other documents you may have in your possession with 
respect to each and every claim you have made for unemployment insurance 
benefits with any state agency. 
20. Please produce each and every document identified in your answers to 
interrogatories served simultaneously with these requests. 
See, Addendum 11, Request for Production, No. 8-17, 20. 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision, Defendants did request documents 
pursuant to discovery rules. Defendants had served Interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 33 Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Requests for Production of Documents, pursuant to Rule 34 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - seeking, among other things, the identity of, and the 
production of, documents related to her prior health care and employment. R. 34 & 36. 
Plaintiff submitted some, but incomplete, responsive information and documents. R. 98-107. 
Defendants then sought by letter4 and phone calls to have Plaintiff provide more complete 
responses to the discovery requests (including addresses of disclosed health care providers 
and former employers) and to provide authorizations to allow Defendants to gather the 
records from out-of-state former health care providers and former employers directly. R. 
110. 
Plaintiff objected and refused to provide the authorizations requested - claiming that 
Plaintiff had already provided all "relevant" documents5 (medical records generated 
4Rule 37(a)(2)(A) requires the parties to confer and attempt to resolve 
discovery issues without trial court involvement. 
5Plaintiff contends that she, alone, determines what records are "relevant" and 
which records are not. R. 89. 
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subsequent to the accident) R. 85, but objected to the requests to sign authorizations because 
the authorizations requested records of "five medical providers who had no involvement or 
relation to the collision." R. 86. Plaintiff also claimed that such a request was improper 
because the authorizations, in effect, would give Defendants "unfettered access to Plaintiffs 
entire medical history." R. 89. 
Plaintiff never based her objection to the authorizations on the claim the 
authorizations were not formally served or that she didn't understand what was requested. 
Rather, the objections were objections of "relevancy, " claims of "unfettered access" to 
Plaintiffs medical records and to the "scope of records" requested. 
Had Plaintiff properly notified counsel or the trial court that she objected to producing 
the authorizations because they were not formally served (which Defendants claim they 
were), the trial court could have considered that argument. Defendants could have responded 
to such claim. If the trial court found that the authorizations were not formally served, and 
believed there was a requirement to do so, the "defect," (if one existed) could have easily 
"cured" by simply requiring Defendants to formally serve the authorizations with a Request 
for Production of the signed authorizations. 
Instead, Plaintiff waited until the issue was "on appeal" and the documents designated 
for appeal had already been identified before raising the issue of an alleged failure to comply 
with Rules 34 and 37. 
Defendants had, in fact, requested the records pursuant to Rule 33 and Rule 34, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, prior to filing the Motion to Compel with the trial Court. Plaintiff 
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(and the trial court) clearly understood what records were being requested. The dispute in 
the trial court was to the scope of the requests; not to the procedure used for the request. 
II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S ORDER COMPELLING AUTHORIZATIONS AND IN 
PRESCRIBING COMPLICATED, TIME-CONSUMING, AND EXPENSIVE 
PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING RECORDS FROM OUT-OF-STATE 
THIRD-PARTIES. 
The issue of whether a trial court has authority to require a Plaintiff to execute medical 
and employment authorizations to allow a defendant to obtain out-of-state records is not a 
new issue to appellate courts. 
The trial court, in exercising its discretion, correctly ruled that it had inherent authority 
to require Plaintiff to execute authorizations to allow Defendant to obtain out-of-state 
records. One of the issues before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in ordering the execution of such authorizations. 
Utah Appellate courts have long held a trial court has broad discretion to handle 
discovery matters affecting cases before the trial court. "Because the trial judge deals 
directly with the parties and the discovery process, he or she has great latitude in determining 
the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's business..." A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Const., 1999 UT App 87, f 36, 977 P.2d 518, rehearing 
denied, certiorari denied, 994 P.2d 1271. A trial court has inherent power "to make, modify, 
and enforce rules for the regulation of the business before [it], to recall and control its 
process, [and] to direct and control its officers..." Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and 
Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, \ 21, 214 P.3d 120 (quoting In Re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 
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217,224 (1913)). The Utah Supreme Court, in Featherstone v. Schaerrer. 2001 UT 86, ^  16, 
34 P.3d 194 (rehearing denied), stated "It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and 
superior jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among 
these are the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, and enforce rules for the 
regulation of the business before the court..." Additionally, Appellate courts grant a trial 
judge broad discretion in determining how a case should proceed. A trial court's mling will 
be overturned only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. Tschaggenv v. Millbank 
Ins. Co.. 2007 UT 37, % 16, 16 P.3d 615, 619.. 
In her Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Compel, Plaintiff did not claim that 
Defendants had failed to seek the records pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 37 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rather, Plaintiff claimed that she did not have the records6 which had 
been requested in her possession, R. 94, and thus did not have to produce such records. She 
claimed that the records requested were irrelevant and "not necessary for the proof of the 
case." R. 94. 
Plaintiffs position regarding discovery in this case is that the only medical records 
in this case which are relevant are those records which Plaintiff determines are relevant and 
which reflect treatment Plaintiff received after the subject automobile accident. R. 88-89. 
6Plaintiff advised the trial court that she was not in possession of Ihe records 
and "it is unknown whether an employer would release the entire personnel file even if the 
employee requested it. Defendants have been provided the contact information for the 
employers, Defendants may contact the employers themselves." R. 94. Emphasis added. 
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Plaintiff has also claimed Defendants are not entitled to her employment records because she 
feels they are "irrelevant".7 
The trial court recognized that in order to properly defend against Plaintiffs claims, 
Defendants are entitled to obtain Plaintiff s prior medical and employment records. The trial 
court further understood that Plaintiffs past medical and employment records are clearly 
relevant in determining Plaintiffs prior physical condition and employment history, to 
establish a "base-line" for her health and employment status so as to determine whether there 
has, in fact, been injury or damage caused. It is also essential to gather such records to 
determine whether pre-existing conditions are present. 
The trial court considered the arguments propounded by Plaintiff regarding relevancy, 
privilege, and the argument that "Defendants may contact the employers themselves" without 
authorization, and rejected them. R. 174. The trial court correctly ruled that Defendants are 
entitled to obtain the medical and employment records of Plaintiff and, insofar as those 
records are located out-of-state, Plaintiff is required to execute authorizations allowing 
Defendant to obtain those records. 
The Court of Appeals decision mistakenly indicates that "Defendants attempted to 
avoid the requirements of Rules 34 and 37 by arguing that the authorizations were the only 
way to access certain records because those records are located outside of Utah." Rahofy, 
U 11. In point of fact, Defendants did not attempt to avoid Rules 34 and 37 - but sought 
7Plaintiff claims her employment records are irrelevant, even though she held 
seventeen different jobs in a five year period of time and now is seeking $724,000 in 
economic damages. Appellee's (Steadman's) Brief, p. 20. 
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discovery pursuant to such rules, including asking the trial court to compel execution of 
authorizations to allow Defendants to obtain the requested out-of-state records (which 
Plaintiff claimed she did not have in her possession). 
Further, Defendants did not claim the authorizations "were the only way to access 
certain records because those records are located outside of Utah." Rather, at oral argument 
before the Court of Appeals, when this issue was first raised, Defendants acknowledged that 
there were other ways to seek the requested records - including the process outlined by the 
Court of Appeals in its decision - but indicated that the procedure outlined by the Court of 
Appeals was cumbersome, expensive, unnecessary and may, in fact, eventually require the 
execution of a release even after a subpoena was obtained in the foreign jurisdiction. 
Counsel indicated that the process suggested by the Utah Court of Appeals would, generally, 
require retention of additional counsel (counsel licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where 
the records are located), require the court to obtain jurisdiction over the parties in the foreign 
jurisdiction, involve the additional costs of filing (and service) of the record-seeking lawsuit 
in the foreign jurisdiction, and other additional costs. Even after the expenditure of these 
significant (and unnecessary) expenses and time, oftentimes health care providers 
nevertheless require a signed authorization from the patient, rather than a subpoena from a 
court. See, Addendum 12, letter from Social Security Administration (in an unrelatedcase)-
affirming federal laws which prohibit the release of records, even when served with a 
subpoena, in the absence of written consent from the individual whose records are being 
requested. 
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Clearly, the trial court was able to exercise its discretion in considering the arguments 
of counsel, considering the costs of compelling execution of authorizations as compared to 
incurring the costs of retaining counsel in a foreign jurisdiction, filing another suit (in the 
foreign jurisdiction), obtaining jurisdiction in the foreign jurisdiction, having the subpoena 
issued in the foreign jurisdiction, and then actually seeking (via the foreign-issued subpoena) 
the records and make its decision. 
The trial court was well-informed of the issues of obtaining Plaintiffs out-of-state 
records. Having considered the memoranda by the parties, having heard oral argument by 
counsel, and having been involved in overseeing this case from its inception, the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in ordering Plaintiff to execute the medical and employment 
records authorizations. 
III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING A PROCEDURE 
TO OBTAIN "OUT-OF-STATE" MEDICAL AND EMPLOYMENT 
RECORDS WHICH IS UNJUST, UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATED, AND 
UNNECESSARILY EXPENSIVE. 
Rule 1(a) refers to the intent of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and states that 
"They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action." See also, W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 
734, 738 (Utah 1977). 
Applying these principles, the trial court considered the position of the parties, 
considered the discovery which had been propounded, the responses to discovery which had 
been provided by Plaintiff, and the requests for the execution of authorizations to obtain out-
of-state records. The trial court, who is charged with overseeing discovery disputes, 
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provided a "just, speedy and inexpensive" way to obtain the records sought - while still 
allowing a procedure (in camera review, if necessary) whereby certain records could be 
additionally reviewed by the trial court to determine if production is appropriate. 
Modern rules of civil procedure are designed to facilitate fair trials with full disclosure 
of all relevant testimony and evidence. Roundv v. Stalev, 1999 UT App 229, ^  8, 984 P.2d 
404, certiorari denied, 994 P.2d 1271. Additionally, rules with respect to discovery must be 
applied with common sense and within reasonable bounds, consistent with its objective. 
State ex. rel. Road Comm'n v. Petty. 412 P.2d 914,917 (Utah 1966). The trial court's Order 
accomplishes these objectives. 
IV. THE PROCEDURE OUTLINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN 
HARMONY WITH OTHER CASES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED THE 
ISSUE OF REQUIRING A PLAINTIFF TO SIGN AUTHORIZATIONS. 
Utah courts have touched lightly on Motions to Compel plaintiffs to sign 
authorizations. In Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, the plaintiffs refusal to sign 
authorizations for release of medical information resulted in several motions to compel which 
were granted by the trial court, f^lj 4-7. The out-of-state medical providers were beyond the 
reach of defendant's subpoenas (as in the present case), and the trial court in Hales ordered 
the plaintiff to sign the authorizations for release of medical information. Id. at ^ 6. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have specifically addressed the practice of requiring a 
party to sign authorizations allowing a defendant to obtain medical records. In Ayuluk v. 
Red Oaks Assisted Living.Inc., 201 P.3d 1183 (Alaska 2009); rehearing denied, March 16, 
2009, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated: 
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[Wjhen a plaintiffs medical privilege has been waived by the filing of suit, 
"discovery should normally proceed without judicial participation../in a 
manner demonstrating candor and common sense.' Requiring a plaintiff to 
furnish medical releases to her adversaries is one way to accomplish that 
objective. Further, so doing as an alternative to requiring plaintiffs counsel 
to produce medical records can result in the discovery of medical records of 
which plaintiffs counsel is aware. It also eliminates requiring defendants to 
rely on plaintiffs counsel... "as the gatekeeper for the production of medical 
records that he considered relevant." 
Ayulek, at 1204. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Rojas v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 641 
So.2d 855, 857 (Florida 1994), held that a trial court had authority to order a personal injury 
plaintiff to sign written authorizations for the release of plaintiffs out-of-state medical 
records and further determined the defendant did not need to file a formal request for 
production of documents through the party. The Rojas court stated: 
The order [from the trial court] here was well within the power and discretion 
of the trial court. A trial court possesses broad discretion in overseeing 
discovery and protecting the parties that come before it. The order entered 
here accomplishes the discovery of the sought after medical records in the 
most expeditious and practical way possible, by having the records released 
directly to the Respondents. It burdens judicial resources the least, and does 
the most to ensure full disclosure so that defendants in personal injury 
litigation can folly and fairly litigate their liability. In fact, orders such as this 
are regularly entered by trial courts, and acquiesced to by plaintiffs. 
Furthermore, ordering the Petitioners to sign written authorizations for the 
release of medical records does not necessitate a violation of their right to 
protect unrelated, undiscoverable matters. A party, such as the Petitioners, 
who objects to the disclosure of parts of a medical record is free to request that 
the entire medical record be submitted to the trial court to review in camera. 
The trial court may then excise or redact the non-discoverable material, if any, 
prior to releasing the records to the party seeking them. 
Rojas, at 857. 
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The Rojas court further stated: 
We hold that the district court's decision provides the most practical and least 
burdensome method for obtaining the records at issue and allows for the 
records to be sent in an expeditious, readable, and uncensored fashion. 
Equally as important, we find that the procedure for obtaining medical records 
from an out-of-state or out-of-country source should be no more burdensome 
than the procedure for obtaining the same type of medical records from an in-
state source. 
Id 
The Indiana Court of Appeals, in Andreatta v. Hunley, 714 N.E.2d 1154 (Ind. App. 
1999), held a trial court was within its discretion when it required a slip and fall plaintiff to 
sign authorizations for defendants to obtain plaintiffs out of state medical records regarding 
plaintiff s pre and post accident medical treatment. The plaintiff in Andreatta, sought to have 
the trial court approve a procedure which would have required plaintiffs medical providers 
to make two copies of all the medical records requested by defendants and allow the 
plaintiffs counsel to first review the records prior to defendants receiving the records. Only 
after plaintiffs counsel reviewed the records, if there was no objection, would the medical 
providers send the second copy of the records to defense counsel. If there was an objection 
by plaintiff to the records, the medical provider was to segregate the records which were 
objectionable and send those records directly to the trial court for an in camera review. Id, 
at 1156. 
The trial court in Andreatta rejected plaintiffs proposed procedure and determined 
that plaintiffs counsel was aware of plaintiff s prior providers and could have obtained a 
copy of the records to review by having plaintiff sign an authorization before defendants 
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sought these records. In upholding the trial court's denial of plaintiff s proposed procedure, 
the Andreatta court stated "They [plaintiffs] urge us to adopt the tortuous procedure of 
requiring medical providers to make two copies of all records, number them and send them 
to counsel. We decline to impose such a procedure upon medical providers or our trial 
courts..." 
Further, the Andreatta court, in holding the trial court was within its discretion in 
ordering plaintiff to sign medical authorizations for plaintiffs out of state providers, stated: 
Generally, matters concerning discovery methods that the trial rules do not 
govern are matters for a trial court's exercise of discretion...Because the scope 
of discovery is highly dependent on the facts of each case, the fact-sensitive 
nature of discovery issues requires a high degree of deference to the decision 
of the trial court... We will interfere with the trial court's ruling on discovery 
matters only where an abuse of discretion is apparent... An abuse of discretion 
occurs only where the trial court's decision is against the logic and 
circumstances of the case... 
Id. at 1159 (Internal citations omitted). 
The Andreatta court determined that, since defendants would be unable to issue a 
subpoena to obtain plaintiffs out-of-state medical records, the trial court acted within its 
discretion in ordering the plaintiff to sign medical authorizations allowing defendant to 
obtain those records.8 Id. 
In Price v. Grefco J n c . 543 N.E.2d 521 (111. App. 1989), the Illinois Court of Appeals 
upheld a trial court's order requiring a personal injury plaintiff to execute medical 
8The Andreatta court also rejected plaintiffs argument that defendants were 
not entitled to obtain her prior medical records because they were protected by the physician-
patient privilege, and stated "When a patient who is a party to a lawsuit places her physical 
condition at issue...the patient has impliedly waived the physician-patient privilege as to that 
condition." Andreatta, at 1157. 
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authorizations permitting a defendant to obtain plaintiffs out-of-state medical records. The 
parties in Price agreed that there was no statute or supreme court rule which expressly 
authorized a court to order a party to execute such an authorization and neither party 
presented any precedential decision by an Illinois Appellate court dealing with this issue. Id. 
at 523. The Price court determined that the trial court was within its discretion in ordering 
the plaintiff to execute the authorizations for out-of-state records. Id. at 523-524. Further, 
after the trial court ordered plaintiff to sign the authorizations, she still refused to do so, and 
the trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint as a sanction for failure to comply with the trial 
court's order. The Price court held the trial court was within its discretion in dismissing 
plaintiffs lawsuit for failure to execute the authorizations as ordered by the trial court. Id. 
at 524. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department for the State 
of New York, in Singh v. Singh, 51 A.D.3d 770, 771, 857 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708-709 (2008), 
held that a trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering a plaintiff, in an assault and 
battery case, to execute authorizations allowing defendants to obtain tax returns filed by 
plaintiff and his company where plaintiff was claiming damages for lost earnings. Id. at 771. 
Here, the trial court was well within its authority, in overseeing discovery disputes, 
to order Rahofy to sign the employment and medical authorizations allowing Defendants to 
obtain the records directly from the out-of-state health care providers and employers. The 
trial court's Order was consistent with, and in furtherance of, the direction of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to ensure "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determination of the action. Ut. 
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R. Civ. P. 1(a). The procedure outlined by the Court of Appeals' decision imposes a 
cumbersome, expensive, time-consuming procedure which undermines the purpose of the 
discovery rules. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in expressing the factual background in this case. 
Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined Defendants had never made a formal discovery 
request for the medical or employment records of Plaintiff. Plaintiff herself conceded in her 
brief to the Court of Appeals that "Rule 37 and its requirements were never discussed in 
memorandum or argument related to Defendants' Motion to Compel." Appellant's 
(Rahofy's) Brief, p. 28. In point of fact, prior to filing Defendants' Motion to Compel, 
Defendants did formally request the disputed records in the Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents served on Plaintiff. 
The Court of Appeals also erred in reversing the trial court's Order compelling 
Plaintiff to execute authorizations and in setting forth discovery procedures for obtaining 
Plaintiffs records from out-of-state third parties. Trial courts have broad discretion in 
handling the discovery issues which come before them. The Honorable G. Michael Westfall, 
in the present case, after considering the arguments made by Plaintiff, correctly granted 
Defendants' Motion to Compel and ruled Defendants are entitled to obtain signed 
authorizations for the release of Plaintiff s medical and employment records. The trial court 
considered the costs of compelling authorizations compared to incurring the costs of 
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retaining counsel in a foreign jurisdiction, filing another suit in a foreign jurisdiction, having 
subpoenas served in the foreign jurisdiction, then obtaining the records in the foreign 
jurisdiction. The procedure imposed by the Court of Appeals to obtain the out-of-state 
medical and employment records is unjust, overly complicated, and unnecessarily expensive. 
Finally, the procedure set forth by the Court of Appeals to obtain out-of-state records 
is contrary to previous decisions by Utah Appellate courts, as well as courts in other 
jurisdictions which have determined a trial court has discretion to order a personal injury 
plaintiff to execute records authorizations. 
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Attorneys for Respondent - Lynn 
Steadman and Steadman Land & 
Livestock, LLC 
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Tabl 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state of Utah 
in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, 
and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules promulgated by this 
court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws 
in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. They govern all proceedings in actions 
brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except 
to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when 
the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former 
procedure applies. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
Tab 2 
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as 
otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, 
provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual 
likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable 
documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the 
possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, 
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or 
other evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on 
the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under 
which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to 
satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required 
by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under 
subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party 
joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being 
served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably 
available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully 
completed the investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of 
another party's disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or 
less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an 
administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by 
counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are 
subject to discovery under subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used 
at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure 
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving 
expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or 
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the 
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the 
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the 
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact 
discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or 
rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), 
within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information 
regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of 
each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the 
party may call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by 
means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions 
of the deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including 
summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and 
those which the party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required 
by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, 
unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) 
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under 
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made 
to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, 
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be 
deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown. 
(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and 
served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more 
of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written 
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other 
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests 
for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance 
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim 
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be 
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources 
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The 
party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, describing 
the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and 
any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel 
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the 
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is 
made, the court may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good 
cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court may specify conditions for the 
discovery. 
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: 
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable 
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action 
to obtain the information sought; or 
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs 
of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after 
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, 
a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking 
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the 
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been 
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its 
subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain 
without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously 
made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The 
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed 
or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital 
of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose 
opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any 
deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report is provided. 
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been 
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for 
trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or 
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. 
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a 
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule; 
and 
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) of this rule the 
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this 
rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of 
the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions 
from the expert. 
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. 
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable 
under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation 
material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the 
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without 
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the 
applicability of the privilege or protection. 
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a 
claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim 
may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being 
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any 
copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A 
receiving party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a 
determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, 
it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information 
until the claim is resolved. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is 
sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court 
action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on 
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may 
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the 
following: 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a 
designation of the time or place; 
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected 
by the party seeking discovery; 
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited 
to certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the 
court; 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; 
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in 
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such 
terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. 
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2), 
except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have 
met and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is 
filed. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the 
interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and 
the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision 
(a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the 
disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in 
the following circumstances: 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under 
subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is 
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been 
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to 
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty 
extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a 
deposition of the expert. 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, 
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some 
material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not 
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise 
stipulated or directed by order. 
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in 
person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to 
discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable 
information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the 
meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good 
faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures 
under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) 
were made or will be made; 
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be 
completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should 
be limited to particular issues; 
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored 
information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced; 
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation 
material, including - if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production -
whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order; 
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these 
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rules, and what other limitations should be imposed; 
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating 
fault to a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and 
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any 
event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in 
conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also 
include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(1)-(8), except that the date or dates for pretrial 
conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be 
deferred until the close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a 
discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry 
of a discovery order on any topic on which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not 
included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under 
Rule 16(b). 
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery 
plan and discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the 
discovery plan and order. The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after 
joinder. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery 
or response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of 
record or by the party if the party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The 
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the 
request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted 
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly 
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, 
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a 
request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or 
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is 
signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf 
the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
violation, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding 
in another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner 
and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were 
pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of 
such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person 
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters 
arising during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to 
the court shall be submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
(i)(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in 
Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed 
with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach 
to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue. 
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Rule 33. Interrogatories to parties. 
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Without leave of court or written stipulation, any party may 
serve upon any other party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number including all 
discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private 
corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who 
shall furnish such information as is available to the party. Leave to serve additional interrogatories 
shall be granted to the extent consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(3). Without leave of 
court or written stipulation, interrogatories may not be served before the time specified in Rule 26 
(d). 
(b) Answers and objections. 
(b)(1) Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is 
objected to, in which event the objecting party shall state the reasons for objection and shall 
answer to the extent the interrogatory is not objectionable. 
(b)(2) The answers are to be signed by the person making them, and the objections signed by the 
attorney making them. 
(b)(3) The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the 
answers and objections, if any, within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories. A shorter or 
longer time may be ordered by the court or, in the absence of such an order, agreed to in writing 
by the parties subject to Rule 29. 
(b)(4) All grounds for an objection to an interrogatory shall be stated with specificity. Any ground 
not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the partyfs failure to object is excused by the court 
for good cause shown. 
(b)(5) The party submitting the interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with 
respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an interrogatory. 
(c) Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under 
Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to the extent permitted by the Rules of Evidence. 
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to 
the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to 
fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be answered until after designated 
discovery has been completed or until a pretrial conference or other later time. 
(d) Option to produce business records. Where the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or 
ascertained from the business records, including electronically stored information, of the party 
upon whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examination, audit, or inspection of such 
business records, including a compilation, abstract, or summary thereof and the burden of deriving 
or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for 
the party served, it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which 
the answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory 
reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect such records and to make copies, 
compilations, abstracts, or summaries. A specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the 
interrogating party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the party served, the records from 
which the answer may be ascertained. 
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Rule 34. Production of documents and things and entry upon land for inspection and other purposes. 
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request 
(a)(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect, copy, test or sample 
any designated documents or electronically stored information (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, 
sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations stored in any medium from which information can be 
obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent into reasonably usable form), or to inspect, copy, test or sample any 
designated tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the 
possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served; or 
(a)(2) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the 
request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property 
or any designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of Rule 26(b). 
(b) Procedure. 
(b)(1) The request shall set forth the items to be inspected either by individual item or by category, and describe each item 
and category with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the 
inspection and performing the related acts. The request may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored 
information is to be produced. Without leave of court or written stipulation, a request may not be served before the time 
specified in Rule 26(d). 
(b)(2) The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written response within 30 days after the service of the 
request. A shorter or longer time may be directed by the court or, in the absence of such an order, agreed to in writing by 
the parties, subject to Rule 29. The response shall state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related 
activities will be permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to, including an objection to the requested form or 
forms for producing electronically stored information, stating the reasons for the objection. If objection is made to part of an 
item or category, the part shall be specified and inspection permitted of the remaining parts. If objection is made to the 
requested form or forms for producing electronically stored information — or if no form was specified in the request — the 
responding party must state the form or forms it intends to use. The party submitting the request may move for an order 
under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to respond to the request or any part thereof, or any 
failure to permit inspection as requested. 
(b)(3) Unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders: 
(b)(3)(A) a party who produces documents for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course of 
business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the request; 
(b)(3)(B) if a request does not specify the form or forms for producing electronically stored information, a responding party 
must produce the information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are 
reasonably usable; and 
(b)(3)(C) a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form. 
(c) Persons not parties. This rule does not preclude an independent action against a person not a party for production of 
documents and things and permission to enter upon land. 
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, 
may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows: 
(a)(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to the court in which the action is pending, or, 
on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. An application for an 
order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(a)(2) Motion. 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclosure and 
for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted 
to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 3 1 , or a corporation or other 
entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under 
Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will 
be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order 
compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must 
include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to 
make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral 
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for an order. 
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete 
disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions. 
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the 
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party 
or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining 
the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's first making a good 
faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, 
or objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after 
opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who 
opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds 
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(C) I f the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 
26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among 
the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after 
being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a 
contempt of that court. 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party 
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf 
of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or 
Rule 3 5 , , unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take 
such action in regard to the failure as are just, including the following: 
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with 
the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure; 
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical or mental examination, as contempt 
of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or 
the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to 
pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the 
order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of 
no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the 
matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a 
party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on 
behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with a proper notice, 
or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, 
or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, 
the court. on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable 
unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the 
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on motion may take any action authorized 
by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26 
(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause 
for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by 
Subdivision (b)(2). 
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to take any action authorized by 
Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, 
electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
Tab 6 
Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Order after consideration. After consideration of the documents distributed pursuant to 
Rule 50, the Supreme Court will enter an order denying the petition or granting the petition in 
whole or in part. The order shall be decided summarily, shall be without oral argument, and 
shall not constitute a decision on the merits. The clerk shall not issue a formal writ unless 
directed by the Supreme Court. 
(b) Grant of petition. 
(b)(1) Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is entered, the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court forthwith shall notify the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and counsel of 
record. 
(b)(2) If the record has not previously been filed, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall 
request the clerk of the court with custody of the record to certify it and transmit it to the 
Supreme Court. 
(b)(3) The clerk shall file the record and give notice to the parties of the date on which it 
was filed and the date on which petitioner's brief is due. 
(b)(4) Rules 24 through 31 shall govern briefs, argument, and disposition of the petition for 
writ of certiorari. In applying Rules 24 through 31, the petitioner shall stand in the place of the 
appellant and the respondent in the place of the appellee. In lieu of providing the citation or 
statements required by Rules 24(a)(5)(A) and (B), the statement of the issues presented for 
review as required by Rule 24(a)(5) shall include, for each issue, a statement and citation 
showing that the issue was presented in the petition for certiorari or fairly included therein. 
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, an order to that 
effect will be entered, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith will notify the Court of 
Appeals and counsel of record. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sabrina RAHOFY, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Lynn STEADMAN, an individual; and Steadman 
Land & Livestock, LLC, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20090512-CA. 
Dec. 9,2010. 
Background: Automobile accident plaintiff ap-
pealed decision of the District Court, Cedar City 
Department, G. Michael Westfall, J., granting de-
fendants1 motion to compel production of docu-
ments relating to medical treatment she received for 
the injuries she allegedly suffered as a result of the 
accident. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Christiansen, J., 
held that order granting defendants' motion to com-
pel was improper. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €^>961 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k961 k. Depositions, affidavits, or dis-
covery. Most Cited Cases 
The Court of Appeals reviews the district 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to compel 
discovery under the abuse of discretion standard, 
and the Court of Appeals will not find abuse of dis-
cretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or 
where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial 
court's ruling. 
[2] Courts 106 €=>85(3) 
106 Courts 
Page 1 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(F) Rules of Court and Conduct of 
Business 
106k85 Operation and Effect of Rules 
106k85(3) k. Construction and applica-
tion of particular rules. Most Cited Cases 
The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a 
question of law.. 
[3] Courts 106 €==>85(2) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(F) Rules of Court and Conduct of 
Business 
106k85 Operation and Effect of Rules 
106k85(2) k. Construction and applica-
tion of rules in general. Most Cited Cases 
The Court of Appeals will interpret court rules 
according to their plain language. 
[4] Pretrial Procedure 307A €^=>402 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307AH Depositions and Discovery 
307AU(E) Production of Documents and 
Things and Entry on Land 
307AH(E)4 Proceedings 
307Ak402 k. Time for application; 
condition of cause. Most Cited Cases 
Pretrial Procedure 307A €=5403 
307 A Pretrial Procedure 
307AH Depositions and Discovery 
307AH(E) Production of Documents and 
Things and Entry on Land 
307AH(E)4 Proceedings 
307Ak403 k. Request, notice, or mo-
tion and response or objection. Most Cited Cases 
Order compelling defendants' requests for pro-
duction of automobile accident plaintiffs medical 
and employment records before defendants had 
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formally requested the documents was abuse of dis-
cretion; defendants did not establish that they 
served plaintiff with a document request in compli-
ance with rule authorizing production of docu-
ments, they did not describe the items requested 
"with reasonable particularity," but instead broadly 
requested every document contained in plaintiffs 
medical and employment records, they did not at-
tempt to establish that the documents being reques-
ted were in plaintiffs "possession, custody or con-
trol", and without circumventing the discovery 
rules, they could have accessed the requested re-
cords through power of subpoena. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rules 34,37. 
[5] Pretrial Procedure 307A €=^>24 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak24 k. Discovery methods and pro-
cedure. Most Cited Cases 
Defendants must establish their entitlement to 
production of documents using the proper proced-
ures. Rules CivJProc., Rules 34,37. 
[6] Pretrial Procedure 307Aj€>^334 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307AH Depositions and Discovery 
307AH(E) Production of Documents and 
Things and Entry on Land 
307AH(E)1 In General 
307Ak334 k. Persons subject. Most 
Cited Cases 
Pretrial Procedure 307A €==>403 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307AH Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(E) Production of Documents and 
Things and Entry on Land 
307 AII(E)4 Proceedings 
307Ak403 k. Request, notice, or mo-
tion and response or objection. Most Cited Cases 
When documents are in the possession of a 
third party, the subpoena procedure can be used to 
obtain those documents and documents located in 
another state may be obtained by utilizing the sub-
poena procedure in that state. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
45(a)(l)(C)(iii). 
[7] Pretrial Procedure 307A €^>24 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AU(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak24 k. Discovery methods and pro-
cedure. Most Cited Cases 
If a party objects to informal methods of dis-
covery, the party requesting the documents must 
take steps pursuant to recognized procedural rules 
to obtain the relief allowed in the rules of discov-
ery. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 34,37. 
[8] Pretrial Procedure 307A €=>24 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AH(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak24 k. Discovery methods and pro-
cedure. Most Cited Cases 
The discovery process^ is^jnteotionally broad 
and is designed to be simple and efficient. Rules 
CivJProc, Rule 26(b)(1). 
*201 Jamis M. Gardner and Thomas W. Seiler, 
Provo, for Appellant. 
Lowell V. Smith and Trent D. Holgate, Sandy, for 
Appellees. 




% 1 We granted plaintiff Sabrina Rahofy's inter-
locutory appeal to determine whether the district 
court abused its discretion in granting defendants 
Lynn Steadman and Steadman Land & Livestock, 
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LLC's motion to compel. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 This litigation concerns an automobile acci-
dent that occurred in 2005 near Cedar City, Utah. 
Rahofy provided initial disclosures, which included 
the medical information relating to the medical 
treatment she received for the injuries she allegedly 
suffered as a result of the accident, and answered 
Defendants' interrogatories.1^1 Then, in an attempt 
to obtain all of Rahofy's past medical and employ-
ment records not directly related to the accident, 
which were located outside of Utah, Defendants 
sent Rahofy two letters in which they requested she 
sign authorizations to have the records released dir-
ectly to Defendants.1^2 When Rahofy refused to 
sign the authorizations to release all of her past 
medical and employment records, Defendants filed 
a motion to compel and argued that she should sign 
the authorizations because the records are relevant, 
that without the authorizations "Defendants cannot 
obtain the required information," and that the re-
cords are not privileged because Rahofy has put her 
medical and employment histories at issue.1*13 
FNL Although Rahofy's initial interrogat-
ory answers did not contain the addresses 
of some of her former employers, she later 
provided those addresses to Defendants. 
FN2. Defendants requested that Rahofy 
sign general releases to send to all of the 
medical providers she had seen in the last 
twenty years and all of Rahofy's prior em-
ployers so that Defendants could obtain 
directly from those providers and prior em-
ployers all of Rahofy's medical and em-
ployment records. 
FN3. In their motion to compel, Defend-
ants also argued that Rahofy had not fully 
responded to a rule 33 interrogatory asking 
for the addresses of Rahofy's former em-
ployers. However, Defendants had over-
looked the fact that Rahofy had later 
provided this additional information. Thus, 
Defendants acknowledged in their reply 
brief for their motion to compel that the in-
terrogatory had been completely answered. 
Had Rahofy not answered the interrogat-
ory, the district court, in its discretion, 
could have properly entertained Defend-
ants' motion to compel and could have re-
quired Rahofy to answer the interrogatory. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 33, 37(a)(2)(B). 
However, because a complete answer had 
been given to Defendants before the dis-
trict court addressed the motion, the mo-
tion to compel was not based on an insuffi-
cient interrogatory answer and is, there-
fore, not an issue on appeal. 
f 3 Rahofy responded to Defendants' motion by 
arguing that she had completely answered all form-
al discovery requests; that the request to sign the 
authorizations was an informal request; that had the 
request been made as a production of documents re-
quest, Rahofy "would object [to the request] as 
vague, overbroad, and not reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"; that 
Defendants failed to prove the records were in 
Rahofy's possession, which was required for her to 
produce them; that the medical records were priv-
ileged; and that neither the medical nor the employ-
ment records were relevant in this case. 
% 4 After a hearing, the district court granted 
Defendants' motion to compel. Concerning 
Rahofy's employment records, the district court de-
termined that defendants may access any employ-
ment records" and ordered Rahofy to "execute au-
thorizations for all employment records and return 
the signed authorizations to the Defendants" within 
eleven days after the order was filed.13*44 With re-
gard to Rahofy's medical records, the district court 
ordered Rahofy, within eleven days, 
FN4. In fact, the district court ordered 
Rahofy "to execute a release so 
[D]efendant[s] can access any employment 
records that they want to access with re-
gard to [Rahofy] back to when she was 
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selling ... Girl Scout cookies when she was 
nine-years old.... [Defendants] can access 
... any employment records they want." 
to provide to the Court and to the Defendants a 
complete list of every medical record [Rahofy] 
has ever had generated on her behalf, including 
the date, medical provider, medical problem 
presented and medical service providedJfP15! 
The list provided*203 to the Court and to the De-
fendants must be accurate, or the Court may im-
pose sanctions. [Rahofy] is to designate which of 
the medical records listed, [she] believes are not 
relevant to this case and therefore, subject to pri-
vacy. 
FN5. The district court placed the burden 
on Rahofy to obtain and disclose all of the 
requested medical records, even those re-
cords that were not in Rahofy's possession: 
[I]f [Rahofy] doesn't have the copy of 
the record in [her] possession, ... [she] 
simply gather[s] the information by call-
ing and talking to the healthcare pro-
vider, then [she] is required to sign a re-
lease to release those records.... I'm go-
ing to throw the onus of the burden back 
on [Rahofy] with regard to those medical 
records, and require that [she] gather the 
information.... 
Moreover, the district court placed no 
limits on how far back Rahofy must go 
to obtain records or what type of medical 
records she was to provide: 
You have 30 days to provide the list of 
every visit, and as I indicated—what was 
it, every visit, the date of every visit, the 
medical problem that was presented and 
the service that was provided.... That 
may very well require that she admit that 
she had hemorrhoids and went to a doc-
tor for it.... 
Defendants shall be entitled to receive medical 
records for those records to which [Rahofy] does 
not claim a privacy privilege. [Rahofy) is either 
to disclose those specific records directly to De-
fendants, or, if [Rahofy] does not have a copy of 
a specific record in her possession, [she] is re-
quired to sign an authorization for release to re-
lease those specific records. 
Regarding [Rahofy]'s designation of health 
care providers which [she] claims are privileged 
and irrelevant to the issues raised in this litiga-
tion, Defendants have 30 days after receipt of the 
list of health care providers which [Rahofy] 
claims are irrelevant and subject to privacy, to 
object to [Rahofy]'s designation by filing a mo-
tion with the Court 
In the event that Defendants file a motion with 
the Court, [Rahofy] will have an additional 30 
days to obtain ail such records from the various 
health care providers and submit all such records 
to the Court. The Court will review these records 
in camera, and make a determination as to 
whether or not they are to be disclosed. 
(Emphasis in original.) We granted Rahofy's 
interlocutory appeal to determine if" the ~districf 
court abused its discretion in entertaining and 
granting Defendants' motion to compel. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f 5 Rahofy challenges the district court's order 
that granted Defendants' motion to compel. More 
specifically, Rahofy argues that because Defend-
ants did not formally request the medical and em-
ployment records pursuant to rule 34 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to compel, 
which requires a formal request, was not proper. 
Moreover, Rahofy argues that the district court ab-
used its discretion in granting the motion to compel 
because the records and information sought were 
not relevant, were privileged, and were not in her 
possession.1^6 
FN6. Both Rahofy and Defendants argue 
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about the relevance and privileged status 
of the requested records. While these sub-
stantive issues may eventually need to be 
determined, we review only whether the 
proper procedures were followed to entitle 
Defendants to a motion to compel the pro-
duction of those items in the first place. 
Defendants provided very little legal or 
factual arguments, either at the district 
court or on appeal, regarding whether they 
followed the proper procedures pursuant to 
rules 34 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Because we determine that De-
fendants did not follow the proper proced-
ures, we do not reach the merits of the oth-
er issues Rahofy raises on appeal. 
[1][2][3] f 6 We review the district court's de-
cision to grant or deny a motion to compel under 
the abuse of discretion standard. See Cannon v. Salt 
Lake Reg'l Med. Or., Inc., 2005 UT App 352, f 7, 
121 P.3d 74. "[W]e 'will not find abuse of discre-
tion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or 
where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial 
court's ruling.' " Id (citation omitted). "(T]he inter-
pretation of a rule of procedure is a question of 
law," Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 15, 16 P.3d 
540, and "[w]e interpret court rules ... according to 
their plain language," Staley v. Jolles, 2010 UT 19, 
1 14, 230 P.3d 1007 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). See also Arbogast Family Trust v. River 
Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40, f 18, 238 P.3d 1035 
("When we interpret a procedural rule, we do so ac-
cording to our general rules of statutory construc-
tion."). 
*204 ANALYSIS 
% 1 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the sur> 
ject matter involved in the pending action." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The rules outline a procedure 
through which parties involved in litigation can ob-
tain a broad range of discoverable items. See, e.g., 
id R. 33, 34. 'The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that the general purpose of discovery is 'to remove 
elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and 
the court can determine the facts and resolve the is-
sues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as pos-
sible.' " Cannon, 2005 UT App 352, \ 8, 121 P.3d 
74 (quoting Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 
P.2d 39, 40 (1967)). "[T]he purpose of the rules of 
civil procedure pertaining to discovery 'is to make 
procedure as simple and efficient as possible by 
eliminating any useless ritual, undue rigidities or 
technicalities....' " Id (citation omitted). Although 
the rules expressly allow parties to agree to inform-
al discovery procedures, see Utah R. Civ. P. 29(2), 
the discovery rules, in the absence of such an agree-
ment, set forth a procedure to effectuate an efficient 
discovery process. 
f 8 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow a 
trial court to grant a motion to compel discovery, 
see id. R. 37(d), if a party has not adequately re-
sponded to a discovery request made in the form of 
interrogatories, see id R. 33, or a request for pro-
duction of documents, see id R. 34. See also Toma 
v. Weatherford, 846 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir.1988) 
(interpreting substantially similar federal rule 37 
and stating that " Rule 37(a)(2) gives a requesting 
party under Rules 33 or 34 a specific remedy for 
failure to answer interrogatories or requests for pro-
duction: a motion for an order compelling an an-
swer"). 
% 9 Rule 34 requires that a party requesting 
documents must serve the request, which describes 
"with reasonable particularity" the item or items re-
quested, Utah R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1), and that the re-
quested documents must be "in the possession, cus-
tody or control of the party upon whom the request 
is served," id. R. 34(a)(1). Rule 34 also allows the 
party receiving the request to make proper objec-
tions if the receiving party believes that the docu-
ments are protected. See id R. 34(b)(2). Any objec-
tions must be specific and made within thirty days. 
See id. Furthermore, all requests, responses, and 
objections must be signed by an attorney certifying 
that the request is made in compliance with Utah's 
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laws and rules, that the request is not "for any im-
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unne-
cessary delay or needless increase in the cost of lit-
igation," and that the request is "not unreasonable 
or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the 
needs of the case." ^ Id. R. 26(g). 
FN7. One party may question the motives 
of the other party's refusal to produce doc-
uments as an attempt to hide discoverable 
information. However, when the rules of 
procedure are followed, an attorney's sig-
nature certifies that the objection is made 
for a proper purpose. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(g). This allows the trial court to impose 
sanctions if the objection or delay was im-
proper. See id. By sending letters rather 
than a formal document request, not only 
did Defendants not have to certify that the 
request was made for a proper purpose, but 
Rahofy's objections were also not certified 
as being for a proper purpose. Cf. Barnard 
v. Mansell, 2009 UT App 298, \ 8, 221 
P.3d 874 (mem.) (discussing the different 
implications of signing a motion for sanc-
tions as opposed to signing a warning let-
ter). 
[4] f 10 The parties agree that Defendants re-
quested Rahofy's medical and employment records 
through letters.™8 Defendants did not establish 
before the district court that the letters in which 
they requested the authorizations be signed were 
valid requests for documents under rule 34 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. First, Defendants 
did not establish, or even attempt to establish, be-
fore the district court that they *205 served Rahofy 
with a document request in compliance with the 
rule, see id. R. 34(a)(1). On appeal, Defendants 
suggest that the letters were properly served, but no 
record cite or legal authority was presented to es-
tablish this claim. Second, Defendants did not de-
scribe the items requested "with reasonable particu-
larity," id. R. 34(b)(1), but instead broadly reques-
ted every document contained in Rahofy's medical 
and employment records. Finally, Defendants did 
not even attempt to establish before the district 
court that the documents being requested were in 
Rahofy's "possession, custody or control." Id. R. 
34(a)(1). In fact, Defendants have consistently ac-
knowledged, and the district court likewise ac-
knowledged in its order, that some of these docu-
ments were not in Rahofy's possession but in the 
possession of people or entities located outside of 
Utah. Therefore we conclude that the district court 
abused its discretion by granting the motion to 
compel before Defendants had formally requested 
the documents under the rules.™9 
FN8. We note that the record contains De-
fendants' certificate of service for their re-
quest for production of documents from 
Rahofy. However, the actual request, 
which presumably contained a list of docu-
ments requested that did not include the 
documents subsequently requested by their 
letters, is not part of the record. Neverthe-
less, neither party claims that Defendants 
requested that Rahofy sign the medical and 
employment authorizations other than 
through the letters. Therefore, we consider 
only whether Defendants' letters satisfied 
the requirements of rule 34. 
FN9. We do not separately analyze rule 33 
because Defendants were clearly request-
ing that Rahofy facilitate the production of 
documents, which request would not fall 
under rule 33 but, rather, under rule 34. 
[5] \ 11 Defendants attempted to avoid the re-
quirements of rules 34 and 37 by arguing that the 
authorizations were the only way to access certain 
records because those records are located outside of 
Utah. While ultimately they may be entitled to such 
records,***10 Defendants must establish their enti-
tlement using the proper procedures. See Brown v. 
Glover, 2000 UT 89, \ 30, 16 P.3d 540 ("[A]n at-
torney has a responsibility to use the available dis-
covery procedures to diligently represent her client. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the 
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FN10. Because of the procedural deficien-
cies in this case, we make no determination 
as to whether the medical and employment 
records are relevant or privileged. We also 
need not make any determination as to the 
appropriate method for obtaining authoriz-
ations for release of records except as 
stated herein. 
[6] f 12 When documents are in the possession 
of a third party, the subpoena procedure can be 
used to obtain those documents. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
45(a)(l)(C)(iii) (stating that a subpoena 
"command[s] each person to whom it is directed ... 
to copy documents or electronically stored informa-
tion in the possession, custody or control of that 
person and mail or deliver the copies to the party or 
attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena be-
fore a date certain"); see also id R. 34(c) (stating 
that the rule for production of documents "does not 
preclude an independent action against a person not 
a party for production of documents"). Documents 
located in another state may be obtained by utiliz-
ing the subpoena procedure in that state. Defend-
ants seek records located in Virginia, Illinois, and 
Hawaii. Although these states differ in their proced-
ure, each allows for the subpoenaing of records loc-
ated in their state.1™1 We readily acknowledge 
that to obtain*206 all of the information Defendants 
seek they may have to undertake a time-consuming 
and expensive process. However, because Defend-
ants could have accessed the requested records 
without circumventing the discovery rules, the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in entertaining and 
granting the motion to compel. 
FN11. Virginia has adopted the Uniform 
Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, 
see Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.01-412.8 to 
-412.15 (2010), which Utah has also adop-
ted, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-17-101 
to -302 (2008). Virginia allows a subpoena 
obtained from another state to be served in 
Virginia if "a written statement that the 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
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law of the foreign jurisdiction grants recip-
rocal privileges to citizens of [Virginia] for 
taking discovery in the jurisdiction that is-
sued the foreign subpoena." Va.Code Ann. 
§ 8.01-412.10(A). The subpoena can be 
used to produce designated documents and 
records, see id § 8.01-412.12, and once a 
party files the subpoena, it is "served in 
compliance with the applicable statutes o f 
Virginia, id § 8.01-412.11. If Rahofy 
were to challenge the subpoena, she could 
file for a protective order or a motion to 
quash or modify the subpoena in a Virginia 
court. See id § 8.01-412.13. 
Illinois and Hawaii have not adopted the 
uniform act. In Illinois, a subpoena may 
be issued for an action pending in a court 
of another state. See 111. Sup.Ct. R. 
204(b). Although the Illinois rule limits 
the subpoena power to depositions, 
Illinois case law has extended the sub-
poena power to other discovery allowed 
under Illinois rules. See Eskandani v. 
Phillips, 61 I11.2d 183, 334 NJE.2d 146, 
153 (1975); Mistier v. Mancini, 111 
Ill.App.3d 228, 67 IlLDec. 1, 443 N.E.2d 
1125, 1128 (1982); see also 735 111. 
Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-1003(a) 
(LexisNexis 2010) (determining scope of 
discovery in personal injury cases). 
Hawaii has a somewhat more onerous 
procedure for obtaining a subpoena that 
begins with hiring an attorney licensed 
in Hawaii for the limited purpose of fil-
ing a miscellaneous action. See generally 
Haw.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 624-27 to - 28 
(LexisNexis 2010); Victoria Bushnell, 
How to Take an Out-of-State Depos-
ition, 14 Utah Bar J. 28, 30 (2001). Al-
though subpoenaing out-of-state records 
is not as simple as having the opposing 
party sign an authorization releasing 
those records, Defendants have argued 
that a great deal of money is involved in 
to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
245 PJd 201, 671 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2010 UT App 350 
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this case. Thus, like all discovery and lit-
igation decisions, Defendants will need 
to weigh the need for the information 
against the time and expense of obtain-
ing it. See Victoria Bushnell, How to 
Take an Out-of-State Deposition, 14 
Utah Bar J. 28, 30 (2001). 
17] [8] 1 13 We note that this opinion in no way 
discourages parties from cooperating in informal 
discovery procedures such as the use of an author-
ization or a waiver of privilege. In fact, it may be 
advantageous for parties to agree to more limited 
requests in exchange for the release of only certain 
documents to expedite the litigation process and re-
duce expenses. m12 That being said, if a party ob-
jects to informal methods of discovery, the party re-
questing the documents must take steps pursuant to 
recognized procedural rules to obtain the relief al-
lowed in our rules. 
f 14 We reverse and remand because the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in granting Defend-
ants* motion to compel when Defendants failed to 
request documents pursuant to the discovery rules. 
f 15 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Presiding 
Judge and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., Judge. 
Utah App.,2010. 
Rahofy v. Steadman 
245 P.3d 201, 671 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2010 UT App 
350 
END OF DOCUMENT 
FN12. We remind counsel that the discov-
ery process is intentionally broad and is 
designed to be simple and efficient. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ( "Parties may ob-
tain discovery regarding any matter ... 
which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action.... It is not 
ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if 
the information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence."); Cannon v. Salt Lake 
Reg'l Med Ctr.y Inc., 2005 UT App 352, \ 
8, 121 P.3d 74. Without the open exchange 
of relevant information between parties, 
the purpose of the discovery rules will be 
frustrated and litigation will become costli-
er than it already is. If there is relevant, 
nonprivileged information located in 
Rahofy's past medical and employment re-
cords, Defendants are entitled to it if they 
properly request it, subject to the subpoena 
procedure of other states. 
CONCLUSION 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on May 22, 2009) 
3 THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the motion 
4 to compel in the case of Sabrina Rahofy vs. Lynn Steadman and 
5 Steadman Land and Livestock, Inc., case No. 070500807. Who do we 
6 I have appearing? 
7 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, Lowell Smith for the defendants. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. GARDNER: Jamis Gardner for the plaintiff. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. I was hoping, gentlemen, that we 
11 could reach an agreement with regard to this. Apparently that 
12 hasn't happened. The defendant has asked me to rule on this 
13 motion without a hearing, but the plaintiff requested a hearing. 
14 So what else did the plaintiff want to tell me that would justify 
15 everybody showing up here today, Mr. Gardner? 
16 MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, we just felt like this was an 
17 important issue related to the plaintiff's privacy, and that the 
18 issues in this, we wanted to fully argue before the Court in 
19 addition to just what the pleadings have presented. That's why 
20 we felt like we wanted to argue this fully because of the privacy 
21 issues that are at risk. 
22 We have already provided all of the medical records 
23 that we believe we have in our possession that relate to the 
24 collision, and what they are asking for is beyond that. We felt 
25 like it was necessary to underline that issue with the Court. 
-3-
1 THE COURT: Okay. So what else do you want to present 
2 me today -- to me today? 
3 MR. GARDNER: Well, your Honor, we just want to 
4 reiterate some of the facts that — first of all, in their 
5 objection to the request for a hearing, they represent to the 
6 Court that our last offer — or that our position was that we 
7 wanted the records to be sent to us first and then we would send 
8 them to them. What we had thought we had agreed to at the last 
9 hearing was that we would — the records would be sent to your 
10 Honor or a third party, and they would decide what was relevant, 
11 and then they'd send those to the defendant. So it wasn't like 
12 we were just withholding that. 
13 So in their objection they've either misunderstood what 
14 we thought we had agreed to or mischaracterized that agreement. 
15 So we just wanted to clarify that we believed the context of this 
16 is crucial in that the case law that they have cited in Jackson 
17 v. Kennecott, there are four factors that they must show, and 
18 they fail the first three. They have failed to show that these 
19 documents are relevant. They have failed to show that they are 
20 in our possession, and they've failed to show that they are 
21 relevant to the case. 
22 We've already — like I said, we've provided them 
23 what — everything we believe to be related to the collision, and 
24 if they need to go a few years back, that's normally what we do 


























from when she was 19-years-old. How is that relevant to her 
accident and some injury -- left wrist injuries and some back 
injuries. That's not relevant. That's not important to this 
case. How is it relevant that when she was 16 she worked at 
McDonald's? Why do they need personnel files or those records to 
determine whether or not as a 31-year-old she is now competent or 
whatever as the -- in the real estate profession and needs that 
information to go forward. 
So the case that they have cited, they have failed it. 
I believe, your Honor, that the most important factor is that, 
you know, this is a type of issue that has already come before a 
district court, and unfortunately the judge who had it the first 
time around didn't have the opportunity of prior existing case 
law, and so that got appealed. 
We don't need to go through that process because the 
Supreme Court in 2008 just reviewed this issue. They said in the 
Barbuto case — Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008, "Rule 506(d)(1) does 
not mean that the patient has consented to the disclosure of his 
entire medical history. Rule 506 is only broad enough to allow 
the disclosure of information relevant to an element of any claim 
or defense. Therefore, it is a limited waiver of privilege, 
confined to court proceedings, and restricted to the treatment 
related to the condition at issue." 
So this is an issue that's already been decided for 
your Honor, and the Supreme Court has gone over it with specific 
-5-
reference to these type of medical requests that are beyond 
what has been asked for. They didn't -- the defendants haven't 
actually made that clear in their memorandums because they've 
just — memoranda. They've said, "We've requested these records; 
they didn't give them to us." Well, we gave them everything we 
believe to be relevant, but now they want more than that. 
That is where that limit of waiver of privilege applies. 
So we believe that our client does not need to be subjected to 
her medical records being reviewed by defendants simply because 
she filed a lawsuit related to an accident. Why her gynecological 
records or obstetric records, or why she — when she had a cold 
when she was nine, how that is relevant to this case. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. What else do you want to 
bring to my attention? 
MR. GARDNER: Just that, your Honor, in State vs. 
Cardall, the last — the last point I'd like to make, in State 
v. Cardall, if they make a general request, which they've made 
here, just a general request for the records from these doctors, 
they — the plaintiff still holds the privilege. She gets to 
make that decision whether those are going to be released, if 
they're not related to the treatment, the condition at issue. 
So she has made the decision, and as Counsel we've consulted on 
that, and that's -- the decision is final, according to the Utah 
Supreme Court in 1999. That decision is final. 
Now if they can — if they — it says, "Unless defense 
-6-
1 Counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was 
2 withheld and brings it to the attention of the Court, the 
3 decision is final." Now if they make specific requests, then the 
4 case law suggests that we give it to the Court, the Court reviews 
5 it in camera and then gives it to the defense. That's what we 
6 offered, which that's — we "don't believe they're entitled to 
7 that, because they haven't made a specific request, but we were 
8 willing to provide that, even though it wasn't a specific 
9 request. 
10 Based on what they're asking, it's a general request, 
11 and that's the point. So the -- when they first sent us these 
12 requests for authorization, it related to the employment records 
13 going back to when she was 16. Tom Seiler, who is with our 
14 office, and he's been on the board of governors right now with 
15 the UAJ, the Utah Association for Justice, which was the Utah 
16 Trial Lawyer's Association. When we received those he sent a 
17 letter and said, NNCan you point me to a statute or a case law 
18 that you believe entitles you to that information, because I've 
19 never seen that, and I'd like to look at that and know why it is 
20 you believe you're entitled to employment records related to a 
21 car accident." 
22 You know, we've given them tax returns. We can look for 
23 W-2fs if we haven't already given those and provide what we need 
24 to, but the case law in Utah is specific already in this — on 
25 this case. It's already been decided. So we believe it should 
-7-
1 be an easy decision for the Court because it can look at the 
2 precedents in this Utah court and not need to worry about later 
3 appeals because the Court's already decided this issue. 
4 I In their reply memorandum, the defendants raise this 
5 issue of good cause, that we have failed to provide good cause 
6 for why we didn't provide these documents. First of all, privacy 
7 is always a good cause. Second of all, they've just then 
8 attempted to shift the burden. 
9 We don't have that burden. They've not cited a single 
10 case that mentions the words "good cause." They have the burden 
11 to show that the documents are relevant, in our possession and 
12 necessary to the case, according to their own case law they've 
13 cited, and that's just the generic case law, let alone the 
14 specific case law on records related to privilege that are a 
15 limited privilege, and our client has not released that 
16 privilege. 
17 So your Honor, we would ask that the Court deny the 
18 motion, that we not be forced to sign these authorizations for 
19 release. If the Court does feel like the defendant is entitled 
20 to some of these records, we would still ask that they be 
21 submitted to the Court for in camera review, and then the defense 
22 can have whatever you believe to be relevant. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Smith, do you want to 
24 respond? 
25 MR. SMITH: I would, your Honor. Thank you very much 
1 for taking the time to hear us today. In a letter from 
2 Mr. Gardner dated February 9th, 2009, here's the way he 
3 interpreted the Court's order last time we met. "Plaintiff will 
4 submit the authorizations to the respective employers and direct 
5 that the employers provide the employment records to Counsel for 
6 plaintiff. Plaintiff will submit the authorizations to the 
7 I respective medical provider, and direct the medical provider 
8 provide the medical records to Counsel for the plaintiff. 
9 Plaintiff will review the records and provide those records to 
10 defendants, which plaintiff believes to be reasonably likely to 
11 lead to discoverable evidence." 
12 We don't believe that the medial records should be 
13 filtered through the plaintiff's office, and that he should have 
14 the opportunity of deciding unilaterally what's relevant and 
15 what's not relevant. 
16 When we were here before, we indicated that we would 
17 request the records, we would get them, but before we would use 
18 I them in a hearing or a proceeding, we would try and agree upon 
19 whether or not they were relevant. If" we could not agree, then 
20 those records would be presented to the Court. We did not 
21 anticipate, and we did not expect the job to be transferred to 
22 the Court to receive all the medical records and go through and 
23 review those. 
24 We're officers of the Court. We're not going to 
25 distribute these records all over. We're going to take a look at 
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the records that are there to determine whether they' re relevant 
or not. 
Let me just address the relevancy matter. In their 
answers to interrogatories, they identified five healthcare 
providers that were out of state. For one of those, a Dr. Brown, 
they specifically referred to the fact that he treated her for 
a sports related injury to plaintiff's back. In this case, 
plaintiff is claiming injury to her shoulder, knee, ankle, upper 
and lower back. We're clearly entitled to get these records to 
determine what her condition was like before the accident, what 
injuries were caused by the accident, and what the residuals have 
been after. 
When we were here before we talked about the medical 
records, and we agreed that we would not seek the McDonald's 
records, nor the records when she was dog walking, but all of the 
other authorizations would be executed. We would receive those 
records again, to determine what her claim for lost wages is. 
Now it's important to note that of the 25 employers that 
she identified in her answers to interrogatories, she's had 17 
employers since 2001. That clearly would be relevant about an 
earning history, what kind of job she had, why she was employed, 
why she was let go, why she changed employment. 
This is a personal injury action where she has placed 
her health in issue, and she's made a claim for lost wages where 
she has put in issue her earning and her earning capacity. 
-10-
1 Normally we would subpoena those records, but the scope 
2 of the subpoena does not go out of the state. So typically in 
3 these kind of cases we have the plaintiff execute releases and 
4 authorizations; we then obtain those records. 
5 This case has been pending since — the accident 
6 happened August 7th, 2005. Suit was filed October 2nd, 2007, 
7 and we have been trying since we filed our answer to gather 
8 this information so we could move this matter forward. We have 
9 prepared the case management order, which then has fallen off 
10 track because we've had these discovery disputes. 
11 We would recommend to the Court that the Court issue its 
12 order that the plaintiff execute the releases and authorizations, 
13 that those records come to us. We're happy to provide an exact 
14 copy of everything we get to Mr. Seiler and Mr. Gardner. If we 
15 can't agree on how those records are going to be used at trial or 
16 in motions or in other discovery efforts, at that point we could 
17 involve the Court to look at the relevancy. We're clearly 
18 entitled to gather the records. We're entitled to review them 
19 in order the evaluate the claims. 
20 I think this is a -- and part of the reason we asked 
21 that we not come down for a hearing was because we thought we 
22 had resolved all these issues before, and maybe there was just 
23 a misunderstanding as to how the Court was going to rule. But 
24 we're happy to be here, and I'm happy to answer any questions, if 
25 the Court has any. 
- 1 1 -
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. SMITH: Thank you. 
THE COURT: It isn't your motion. You're defending the 
motion, but I let you speak first. Is there anything else you 
want to bring to my attention? 
MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, if the requests had been 
specified — you know, Mr. Smith brings up the back doctor. It 
was 11 years prior to the accident, but arguably I can see the 
argument for why that particular record might be relevant. But 
they presented all of these, 25 employers and five doctors — 
McDonald's included, dog walking, and gynecological records. 
So it wasn't -- they didn't ask us to go through and 
tell us which ones we would sign. They said, "Sign these 25, 
sign these five." So we've had to defend against all 30 of these 
authorizations for release. If they had limited it or we — to 
the back doctor or the recent real estate professional that she's 
in, maybe we can reach an agreement, but when it's all 30, and 
we've already provided them the information of wages, employment, 
position, they can use that information to present to the jury, 
"Look, she's been employed at 17 different places since she 
was -- since 2001." They can depose her about why she wasn't 
there or why she left. 
The personnel files from all those people are not 
relevant, and there's no statute or law that says they're 



























a per — a car accident and her future loss of earning. In all 
these cases — we did tax returns and W-2's, and then the experts 
argue about how much she could make. So we've had to defend 
against all of these because that's the request that was made 
to us — or rather, the demand. So based on that, we've had to 
defend against this. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. First of all, with 
regard to the employment records, I can't see any reason why the 
plaintiff -- why the defendant shouldn't have access to whatever 
the defendant wants to spend the time looking for. They may very 
well be wasting their time, but it's their time they're wasting. 
So within 30 days of today's date the plaintiff is 
required to execute a release so the defendant can access any 
employment records that they want to access with regard to the 
plaintiff back to when she was selling cookies when she was — 
Girl Scout cookies when she was nine-years-old. You're right, it 
may never come before the jury, but I don't know that until I see 
it. So that -- you're required to do that within 30 days, 
execute that release. They can access any healthcare -- or 
excuse me, any employment records they want. 
With regard to the medical care records, this is what 
I'm going to rule. Within 30 days the plaintiff is to provide to 
the Court and to the defendant a complete list of every medical 
record the plaintiff has ever had generated on her behalf with 
the date, the doctor and the medical problem that was presented, 
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1 and the service that was provided. You don't have to go into any 
2 detail, but just that much information. 
3 I Then within -- also within that 30 days, the plaintiff 
4 is required to designate which of those records the plaintiff 
5 believes are not relevant to the case, and therefore should be 
6 subject to the plaintiffs privacy right and not disclosed. Any 
7 other records not so designated are either to be disclosed, or 
8 if the plaintiff doesn't have the copy of the record in their 
9 possession, and you know, they simply gather the information by 
10 calling and talking to the healthcare provider, then they are 
11 to — the plaintiff is required to sign a release to release 
12 those records -- those specific records. 
13 With regard to the items that are in the list that 
14 the plaintiff claims should not be disclosed, the defendant 
15 then has 30 days thereafter to file a motion with the Court to 
16 review those records and decide whether or not they're relevant. 
17 Then if that motion is filed, then the plaintiff has the 
18 responsibility to gather all of those records, and the plaintiff 
19 has a responsibility to have those records available so that I 
20 can review them. 
21 I fully agree with the plaintiff's position that there 
22 may be records that are irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed, 
23 but I don't know that until I see them. The defendant doesn't 
24 know what additional information they want -- may want to find, 



























find out what's there. 
I'm going to throw the onus of the burden back on the 
plaintiff with regard to those medical records, and require that 
the plaintiff gather the information, submit the information, 
and then with regard to those records that they don't want to 
produce, gather the records, in the event the defendant then 
files a request that any of those specific records be disclosed. 
Do both Counsel understand my order? 
MR. SMITH: I think we — I do, your Honor. 
MR. GARDNER: I think so, your Honor. Just for 
clarification, those five medical providers, we don't have any 
of their records right now. So for her to -- she's just going 
to have to go from her memory and call them, like you say. So 
she's -- I'm just saying — 
THE COURT: You have 30 days to provide the list of 
every visit, and as I indicated — what was it, every visit, 
the date of every visit, the medical problem that was presented 
and the service that was provided, without going into any detail. 
That may very well require that she admit that she had 
hemorrhoids and went to a doctor for it, but that's where we're 
at. I don't -- if there were disclosures made, obviously we 
don't make — we're not going to get into those disclosures at 
this point. 
Then once you provide that list, then the burden shifts 
to the defendant to go through that list and say, "I want — I 
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1 believe that this record is something the Judge should look at," 
2 and then they designate those records. They have 30 days to do 
3 that. Once those are presented to you, then — and a motion is 
4 filed, then you — I'm going to give you an additional 30 days to 
5 gather the records and provide them to the Court, and then I will 
6 look at them in camera and make a determination as to whether or 
7 not they ought to be disclosed. 
8 MR. GARDNER: I just wanted to confirm that in that 30 
9 days, I don't think it's reasonable that we'll be able to get the 
10 actual records, but she's going to do her best to provide them. 
11 THE COURT: Yeah, you have 90 days, essentially, to get 
12 the records, if my math is right. You have 30 days to designate 
13 the records — well, and then they have 30 days to designate 
14 which ones they want you to — that they think that should be 
15 pro — they think should be produced that you don't want to 
16 produce, and I guess they could do that in five days if they 
17 want. But then you have from that time — that notice is 
18 provided, you have an additional 30 days to gather all of those 
19 records and submit them to the Court. 
20 MR. GARDNER: I just mean in that first 30 days. 
21 THE COURT: Right. No, I understand. 
22 MR. GARDNER: It will be based on what she can remember. 
23 THE COURT: Yeah, you'll have at least 60 days to gather 
24 whatever records need to be presented to me so I can determine 



























MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I understand it's just not what 
she can remember. She has to take some affirmative action to 
contact the doctors and find out what those — 
THE COURT: That's correct. That is — it's her 
responsibility. Since she wants to protect that privacy 
interest, and we don't know, you don't know, I don't know if 
there really is a privacy interest to be protected, she has the 
burden of gathering that information and providing it. If she 
doesn't, then I may very well impose some sanctions, which could 
be fairly serious in this case. 
I realize that the plaintiff s position is that all 
of this information should be filtered through the plaintiff, 
and I just disagree with that. I — the plaintiff is not the 
appropriate -- plaintiff s Counsel is not the appropriate party 
to filter whether or not — to provide the filtering process to 
determine whether evidence is or is not relevant. That's simply 
not the plaintiffs Counsel's prerogative. 
MR. GARDNER: I just want to — just trying to clarify 
to that first 30-day list may not be based on actual records, but 
will be based on her homework that she's doing to get that list 
and calling the doctors, but I don't know that we'll be able to 
get the actual records for that first 30-day list. 
THE COURT: Well, and if I — and I'm not saying that 
you have to have the actual records, but the information that you 
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1 provide better be accurate, because if it's not, then I may very 
2 well impose some sanctions because I — this has been going on 
3 long enough. I'd hoped that you'd be able to resolve it. This 
4 essentially stalls the case. You know, I'd like to see this 
5 issue get resolved. 
6 1 Mr. Smith, can you prepare an order for my signature? 
7 MR. SMITH: Thank you, your Honor. I will. 
8 THE COURT: All right. I hope that I've made it clear 
9 enough. Let me see if there is anything else. 
10 MR. SMITH: May I suggest to the Court that we may 
11 need to submit an amended case management order, but we'll work 
12 together to prepare that. 
13 THE COURT: See if you can work that out. All right. 
14 Thank you. 
15 MR. SMITH: Thank you very much. 
16 THE COURT: That's all in that matter, and that 
17 I concludes the matters on the Court's 9 o'clock calendar. 
18 MR. SMITH: Have a nice weekend, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. 
20 (Hearing concluded) 
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ORDER 
1. The Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return 
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2. On or before June 22,2009, the plaintiff is to provide to the Court and to the 
Defendants a complete list of every medical record the plaintiff has ever had generated on 
her behalf, including the date, medical provider, medical problem presented and medical 
service provided. The list provided to the Court and to the Defendants must be accurate, 
or the Court may impose sanctions. Plaintiff is to designate which of the medical records 
listed, plaintiff believes are not relevant to this case and therefore, subject to privacy. 
3. Defendants shall be entitled to receive medical records for those records to 
which Plaintiff does not claim a privacy privilege. Plaintiff is either to disclose those 
specific records directly to Defendants, or, if the Plaintiff does not have a copy of a specific 
record in her possession, Plaintiff is required to sign an authorization for release to release 
those specific records. 
4. Regarding Plaintiffs designation of health care providers which Plaintiff 
claims are privileged and irrelevant to the issues raised in this litigation, Defendants have 
30 days after receipt of the list of health care providers which Plaintiff claims are irrelevant 
and subject to privacy, to object to Plaintiff's designation by filing a motion with the Court. 
5. In the event that Defendants file a motion with the Court, Plaintiff will have 
an additional 30 days to obtain all such records from the various health care providers and 
submit all such records to the Court. The Court will review these records in camera, and 
make a determination as to whether or not they are to be disclosed. 
2 
000175 
DATED th is / / day of 
Approved as to form: 
Jamis M. Gardner 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
6/?/*? 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this day of , 2009, to: 
Jamis M. Gardner 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
2500 N. University Ave. 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Lowell V. Smith, #3006 
Thomas E. Stamos, #5885 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
A Professional Corporation 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801)562-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual, : 
: DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF 
Plaintiff, : INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFFS 
v. : 
: Civil No. 070500807 
LYNN STEADMAN, an individual, : 
and STEADMAN LAND & : Judge G. Michael Westfall 
LIVESTOCK, LLC, : 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the Defendants, Lynn Steadman and Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC, 
and in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, submits 
herewith the following interrogatories to be answered by the Plaintiffs under oath and within 
thirty (30) days of the date of service hereof. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE 
All information is to be divulged which is in the possession of the individual or 
corporate party, attorneys, investigators, agents, employees or other representatives of the 
named party and their attorney. 
A "health care provider" as used in these interrogatories is meant to include any 
medical doctor, osteopathic physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health therapist, 
nurse practitioner, nurses assistant, acupuncturist, neuropathologist, massage therapist, 
podiatrist, doctor of chiropractic, naturopathic physician, or other person who performs any 
kind of healing art. 
Where an individual interrogatory calls for an answer which involves more than one 
part, each part of the answer should be clearly set out so that it is understandable. 
Where the terms "you", "plaintiff1, or "defendant" are used, they are meant to include 
every individual party and separate answers should be given for each person named as 
a party, if the answers are different. 
Where the terms "accident" or "the accident" are used, they are meant to mean the 
incident which is the basis of this lawsuit, unless otherwise specified. 
These interrogatories shall be deemed continuing so as to require further and 
supplemental answers should the Plaintiff receive additional pertinent information between 
the time the answers are served and the time of trial. 
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INTERROGATORIES 
1. Identify yourself by stating the date and place of your birth, your social security 
number, all names that you have ever gone by, and the dates for which you have gone by 
each such name. 
2. State each and every address which you have had in the last ten (10) years, 
the dates of your residence at each, and identify all individuals who resided with you at 
each such address. 
3. Set forth your marital history including the dates and places of each marriage, 
the name, address and phone number of each spouse and former spouse(s) and the date, 
place and manner of termination of each marriage. 
4. State the name, birth dates and addresses of each of your children. 
5. State your social security number. 
6. If you have ever been a party to a lawsuit or have made a personal injury claim 
before, please state the date for each lawsuit or claim, the nature of each lawsuit or claim, 
the names and addresses of all parties involved in the lawsuit or claim, and describe the 
disposition of the lawsuit or claim. 
7. If you have ever been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving honesty, 
such as theft, please state the date of the conviction, the place of the conviction, and the 
charge(s) for which you were convicted. 
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8. Please state the name, address, phone number, and employer of each person 
who may have or claims to have knowledge of the accident or any of the events leading 
up to it or related events occurring thereafter. 
9. Please identify and describe whether any recorded statements, photographs, 
video footage, drawings, diagrams, tests, inspections, measurements, or investigations 
were made or performed regarding the accident scene, any of the objects involved in the 
accident, or any of the persons involved in the accident, and describe the item prepared 
or done, indicate the date such item was taken or prepared, and the name and address of 
the person in possession of each such item. 
10. State and fully describe all special damages that you are claiming in this 
lawsuit including but not limited to medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, 
future losses of earning capacity, etc., and indicate the amounts you are claiming, your 
method for arriving at each such amount, and describe all documentation in your 
possession which supports or may refute such claims. 
11. Describe in detail all injuries and symptoms, whether physical, mental or 
emotional, experienced since the occurrence and claimed to have been caused, 
aggravated, or otherwise contributed to by the occurrence. 
12. If any of the injuries or conditions for which you claim damages for personal 
injuries caused by the accident are an aggravation of a preexisting condition, please 
identify which conditions are an aggravation of a preexisting condition, describe in detail 
the preexisting conditions, and state the name and address of each medical practitioner 
4 
who treated you for the preexisting condition, the date of treatment and the nature of such 
treatment. 
13. If you have suffered any aggravation of the symptoms or injuries which you 
claim from this accident since the time of the accident, please state the date of each such 
aggravation, the cause of each such aggravation, a detailed description of each 
aggravation, the names and addresses of all persons who may have witnessed the 
aggravation, and the names and addresses of all medical practitioners rendering treatment 
for such aggravations. 
14. State the name and address of each medical care provider, including but not 
limited to, each hospital, psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health agency, mental health 
therapist, chiropractor, nurse practitioner, physician's assistant, acupuncturist, 
neuropathologist, massage therapist, or other health care provider who has examined you 
or treated you during the past 20 years and state the dates of treatment, the conditions or 
complaints that led to treatment, and the results of such treatment or examinations. 
15. With regard to all employment or businesses that you have worked for in the 
past 20 years, please state the name and address of each employer, the date of 
commencement and termination, the place of employment, the nature of the duties 
performed, the name and address of each supervisor, the rate of pay received and the 
reasons for termination. 
16. If you have ever applied for or received disability payments, workers 
compensation payments, Medicaid benefits, UMAP benefits, or health insurance benefits, 
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please state the name, address and telephone number of each provider that you applied 
to, the insurance plan or group number used to identify yourself, the dates of the coverage, 
and sought, whether your claim was granted or denied, and if granted, the nature of 
benefits received. 
17. If you have ever applied for unemployment insurance benefits, please identify 
the claim number, assigned to each claim you have made, indicate whether you were 
granted or denied benefits for each claim made, the date of each decision, and the name 
of the government agency that issued the decision. 
18. If you have ever applied for services or benefits from any state or federal 
agency including but not limited to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation, Utah State Office 
of Workforce Services, and the Utah Department of Human Services, please indicate the 
date and governmental agency you applied for said services or benefits, identify the claim 
number assigned to each application you made if a claim number was assigned, indicate 
whether your application for services or benefits was granted or denied, and if granted, 
describe in detail the kind of services or benefits you have received. 
19. Please state the first date following the accident when you consulted with or 
sought the legal advice of an attorney. 
20. State the name, address and phone number of each witness you may call to 
testify at the time of trial and set forth a detailed description of the expected testimony and 
indicate if the witness may be qualified as an expert and if so, set forth the expert's facts, 
6 
opinions, qualifications, rate of pay, and all other items to be disclosed as described in 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this day of January, 2008. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
LOWELL V. SMITH 
THOMAS E. STAMOS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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T a b l l 
Lowell V. Smith, #3006 
Thomas E. Stamos, #5885 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
A Professional Corporation 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801)562-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE F I R " 'iJOICIAI DISlKICi „ , ; u i . ' 
U« >M OOUN1Y. STATE OF US, 
1 /MJhilviA K M I m l i
 (u i i i i i j ivult j . i l , 
Plaintiff, 
LYNN STEADMAN, w\ iml ,vl i..i, 
and STEADMAN LAND & 
LIVESTOCK, LLC, 
Defend • 's. 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMNETS 
^r 070500807 
J U U V . - ^ 
*. uuf endants, and in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34, Utah 
Rul*^ •" * "^ 'M procedur< . * * ' l Is huirwith llii lull i \\ I "Y?i(uc;jl lui I njuJuUiuii ul" 
. u^.i*uinis. i n.>no roquesls nro lo he i'osponded s *1 , Plaintiffs within thirty (30) days of 
the date of s e i w - r.4- *.v> * \* » - ; . .,* -, ,,outl 1, Suite 300, 
^ctndy, Utah 8409 i i ubj^v* :\- v -" joo to ^ny request, or any part therer4 
hf-n ' *.>•.• •
 : _ Wllll,-v ,ne specific objection as to eac!i part. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE 
All documents are to be produced which are in the possession of the individual or 
corporate party, his attorneys, investigators, agents, employees, or other representatives 
of the named party and his attorney. The terms "accident" or "the accident" are meant to 
include the incident which is the basis of this lawsuit, unless otherwise specified. 
The terms "you," "plaintiff1 or "defendant" are meant to include every individual party. 
Full and separate responses should be given for each named person as a party, if 
requested. 
The term "document" is meant to include, but is not limited to, all writings, notes, 
memoranda, correspondence, charts, graphs, records, tapes, pictures, recorded, 
photographed, sketched, drawn or otherwise produced, maintained or stored information. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
Produce: 
1. A copy of your driver's license, permit or certificate, which authorizes you to 
operate a motor vehicle. 
2. Each and every written or recorded statement made by any party or witness. 
3. Each and every photograph or motion picture taken of the accident scene or of 
any objects or person involved in the accident. 
4. Each and every drawing or diagram of the scene of the accident or of any object 
involved in the accident which you intend to use during the trial of the action. 
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\ LaiJi and every report of nnv tests irn pe» Hon ./ measurement made or taken 
with respect to the .:• 
6, Each and every report of any investigation conducted concerninq tl n > n< < iH» >i ml H I 
question. 
< A ciiM'',uIum vitae of each and every person who is skilled m >\ p i i i i ' i ' m i >i 
j y cj i ; ^ .. -,.;.».^ uinnq the trial of this action, and wtiu lias 
expressed an o! union upor -«M- issue in this acn^n. 
8, Each and every medical report, medical record, hospital report, or other docs v 
winch relates to the injuries anc >- •••• - •• -. • I or emotion.il, 
experienced since the occurrence ana claimed to *avo been caused, aggravated, oi 
otherwise contributed to h) / it. 
9. _ Each and every report of any diagnostic study, test or procedure norfi i-oiiod sin< ;e 
the accident. 
bach and C»V<MV receipt bih rheck, invoice orothf i i lnniii iri i l ivlm In MHipmIs 
y • : ^ , allegedly incurred as a result of this accident. 
-ach «nd every medical report, medical record hospiUH '•'- *•-* hospital report, 
io.aiuu a> .my pre-existing condition i.
 ; O J allege was 
aggravated by the accident. 
I I-:I. Lach and every report or other document whicf i you contend supports your claim 
for lost time from gainful employr i ler it. 
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13. Each and every document which you contend supports your claim for impairment 
to earning capacity. 
14. Each and every record, written memoranda, copies of Federal or State Income 
Tax Returns, or other document which purports to show all or any portion of the income 
received by you for the five years immediately preceding the accident to the present time. 
15. Each and every application, record, written memoranda, report or other 
document submitted to the governmental agency and/or private provider to support your 
claim for disability benefits and/or worker's compensation benefits, the decision granting 
or denying benefits, and if granted, each and every record, written memoranda, report or 
other document which shows all or any portion of payments received from disability or 
workmen's compensation. 
16. Please provide copies of all health insurance records, claim forms, eligibility 
cards, or other documents you may have in your possession with respect to all health 
insurance policies, plans of health insurance, or health insurers in your possession. 
17. Please provide copies of all of your unemployment insurance benefit 
applications, state agency records granting or denying unemployment insurance benefits, 
or other documents you may have in your possession with respect to each and every claim 
you have made for unemployment insurance benefits with any state agency. 
18. Please provide copies of each and every application that you have submitted 
for services or benefits from any state or federal agency including but not limited to the 
Utah State Office of Rehabilitation, Utah State Office of Workforce Services, and the Utah 
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Department of Human Services, copies of any and all other documents and records in your 
possession relating to onr 11. in» I1" • v* i y«1. \\\\\ yi M 11i,1v 1111. u\*i, ;md if you have received any 
services or benefits from any agency, a copy of all documents and records rolatinrj l<) I ho 
Serv i ces ni hi j i in«fil" yi II i 11 m/i» r VIA Jlvud. 
'i -j. Hlea.se provide copies of any and all video footage 01 plmloijmplu; oi pl.'iiniili 
lakon Min,i n.t iiri'wi.i IMP if f if if i l l i iriileilyiiig your complaint, 
20. Please prodiK-o each and every documei it identified it i yoi jr answers to 
ifHnrrrKj.'ik^f^:. Li;rvoa jimu;taneously with these requests. 
2 Ph-^e produce each :\ omjrf ."to 
evidence ai iin. , ;... oi irin! 
22. Please nr™!<»';o any - i 1 " 1 ^ ' i ' til' *ii«i i»s, I -lylmiois oi appointments you may have 
for the pastfiv- \ua^>. 
z. Pi'^j- ii»,i! iIIii .I! il II coll phone records including but not limited to 
itemized billed and call records for the 30 days preceding the acciden' • •• • * *ays 
foil* 
• Please produce any ai id all credit card stntomonh 1 im I In \\,\U; ol ||M> aa;hlont 
Jb Please produce any and all e-mail ror.( ml*, im ihm r« n iminwing the accident that 
I" *,rn ' v.-iy discuss the accident or the property where it occui red. 
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DATED this _£f£5-day of January, 2008. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
yc/y^r C^iJflriUte***131 
(ELL V. SMITF 
THOMAS E. STAMOS 









100! J >treet 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
VTA TELEFACSIMILE 
Smith &G!auser,F*C. 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, UT 84094 
S ta t ed - . 
^aseNo.uyf 
*oena Social 
jSeeond Judicial District Court, County of D a v i s ^ ^ ^ 
Records from Canyon Medical Solutions for B H U 
Dear Mr Wright 
you caused to issue in the above referenced case* 
[ I I JC in Salt Lake City, UT to 
le offices ot smittt h Glauser and produce records for 
J works as a contractor of Social Security, and 
ley possess are social Security Administration records* We are unable to 
comply with the subpoena for the following reasons: 
We are writing in response to the sul 
The subpoena purportedly requires J 
therefore^ 
Federal statutes and regulations prohibit the Social Security Administration (SSA) from 
disclosing the contents of its records in the absence of written consent from the individual(s) 
whose records are being requested.{ Release of such records in the absence of the individuals 
written consent could result in civil and criminal penalties. See 5 U.S.C. §552 (b)(6); 5 U.S.C 
§552a(b);42tLS«C §1306;20C.FJl.§40L100et seg^ Because the subpoena in this case was 
not accompanied by the appropriate consent, we are unable to produce any records pursuant to 
the subpoena. 
Second, under the regulations at 20 C.F.R* Part 403 (gee 66 Fed- Reg* 2805 (2001)), an employee 
of SSA may not testify voluntarily or involuntarily, as part of his or her official duties, in 
litigation to which the United States or a Federal agency is not a party without the prior 
authorization of the Commissioner of Social Security or his designee. See, eg.. Moore v. 
Atimour Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F 2d 1194., 1197 (11th Cir. 1991) 
Such consent must: (1) be directed specifically to SSA; (2) specify the records that may he disclosed, to whom the 
disclosure may be made, and the length of time the coosent is effective; and (3) be signed and dated by the 
^dividual 
JUN-05-2004 18:18 P. 002 
CfDJepartment heads [may] promulgate regulations restricting employee testimony in private 
litigation.") (citing United States ex rel Touhv v. Rasen 340 U.S. 462 (1951)). Such 
authorization could not be received by November 24,2010 and, in feet, is rarely given. MSSA 
maintains a policy of strict impartiality with respect to private litigants and seeks to minimize the 
disruption of official duties.*' 20 CF.R. § 403.100 (66 Fed. Reg- at 2809), 
If you wish to pursue tins matter, you must file a written application. j£§£ 20 CF.R. § 403.120 
(66 Fed. Reg. at 2810)- The application must: 
• Describe in detail the nature and relevance of the testimony sought in the legal 
proceeding; 
• Include a detailed explanation as to why you need the testimony, why you 
cannot obtain the information you need from an alternative source, and why 
providing it to you would be in SSA's interest; and 
• Provide die date and time that you need the testimony and the place where 
SSA would present i t 
I<L In addition, you must state the date and time when you need the testimony and the location 
where the testimony will be presented You must submit the application at least 30 days in 
advance of the date when you need the testimony, or provide a detailed explanation as to why the 
application is not timely and why it is in SSAS s interest to review the untimely application. The 
application for testimony must be mailed to: 
Office of the General Counsel 
Social Security Administration 
Office of General Law 
ATTN; Touhy Officer 
P,0. Box 17779 
Baltimore, MD 21235-7779 
We have enclosed a copy of the consent form used by SSA, Please note that there is a separate 
consent required for earnings records. Once an appropriate consent and request for records is 
received from each individual, copies of the requested records will be forwarded to your office. 
Please be aware, however, that retrieval arid transmission of the folder may require up to 6 
months* 
JUN-05-2004 10; HI 
F . 003 
h ederal statutes provide that copies ot any records or other documents in Social Security, when 
authenticated under the Agency seal, shall be admitted in evidence equally with the origuials 
thereof. Sgg 42 U*S ,C. §3505, Rather than appear for the deposition, we will be glad to certify 
the documents. 
if you have any questions please contact Shayla Hadley at (303) 844-2346. 
